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Abstract
We present a dynamic framework for the interaction between borrowing (liquidity) constraints
and deviations of actual hours from desired hours, both measured by discrete-valued indicators,
and estimate it as a system of dynamic binary and ordered probit models with panel data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We analyze a household’s propensity to be liquidity constrained
by means of a dynamic binary probit model. We analyze qualitative aspects of the conditions
of employment, namely whether the household head is involuntarily overemployed, voluntarily
employed, or involuntarily underemployed or unemployed, by means of a dynamic ordered probit
model. We focus on the possible interaction between the two types of constraints. We estimate these
models jointly using maximum simulated likelihood, where we allow for individual random eﬀects
along with an autoregressive process for the general error term in each equation. A novel feature
of our method is that it allows for the random eﬀects to be correlated with regressors in a time-
invariant fashion. Our results provide strong support for the basic theory of constrained behavior
and the interaction between liquidity constraints and exogenous constraints on labor supply.
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1 Introduction
The present paper uses panel data on households to address empirically the interaction between
liquidity constraints and exogenous restrictions on labor supply decisions. Our techniques allow
us to estimate with panel data general dynamic limited dependent variable models with a ﬂexible
dynamic structure. The presence of constraints is taken as an institutional datum. Whether and
when they bind for particular individuals in a given population are the endogenous variables of
interest.
We take as a starting point that capital market imperfections may prevent individuals from bor-
rowing against their future income without collateral.1 Intuitively, households are most likely to
be liquidity constrained at times of events that are closely related to labor market conditions (e.g.,
unemployment) or other events, such as ill health, that have direct consequences for labor supply
behavior. When labor supply is jointly considered with food consumption,2 some serious analytical
diﬃculties emerge. These stem from the fact that observed hours of work (or employment) are not
necessarily the outcome of free choice in the same way as food consumption is. Speciﬁcally, indi-
viduals may be involuntarily unemployed, underemployed, or overemployed. For such individuals,
the unconstrained model of ﬂuctuations in employment and hours worked may not be appropriate.
We address here such qualitative aspects of employment jointly with liquidity constraints.
Our treatment of the endogeneity of regime switching and of the possible dependence between
liquidity constraints and restrictions on labor supply behavior goes further than previous work.
Typically, the past literature has only considered agents who were thought to be either liquidity-
constrained or not constrained, but remained so throughout the period of observation. For example,
Ball (1990) restricts his sample to those who have never been constrained in the labor market.
Casual empiricism suggests, and the data conﬁrm, that switches in the state of households do occur.
Households are most likely to be constrained early in their lifetimes, or at times of major purchases,
changes in employment conditions, or other unforeseen events (death, catastrophic illnesses, etc.),
1See Hall and Mishkin (1982); Flavin (1985); Altonji and Siow (1987); Zeldes (1989a); Ball (1990).
2Food and housing are the only major components of the consumption bundle for which data are consistently
available in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
1while business cycle conditions regularly force them to update their decisions. The evolution over
time of a household’s socioeconomic circumstances makes it all the more important to allow for
endogenous constraints with a dynamic structure.
Allowing for the coexistence of exogenous restrictions on labor supply and liquidity constraints
is a novel feature of the present work. It is ﬁrmly rooted in the modern life cycle theory of labor
supply, while at the same time it encompasses a dynamic generalization of the approach, pioneered
by Ashenfelter (1980), that studies unemployment as a “constraint on choice rather than a result
of it,” the latter being the hallmark of neoclassical theory of freely chosen labor supply. Our results
provide strong support for the basic theory of constrained behavior and the interaction between
liquidity constraints and constraints on labor supply that we propose in this paper. Our work thus
complements important previous research on hours constraints by Ham (1982; 1986), Ham and
Reilly (2002), and Kahn and Lang (1992).
Our econometric models may be estimated in their full generality only by simulation estimation
methods. In this paper we apply the method of maximum smoothly simulated likelihood (MSSL)
developed in B¨ orsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993), Hajivassiliou et al. (1996), and Hajivassiliou
and McFadden (1998). See also Hajivassiliou (2004) for a detailed development of MSSL for general
panel limited dependent variable models with simultaneity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some important aspects of the data
which help motivate our model. Section 3 presents a rudimentary life cycle optimization model
and derives a dynamic discrete choice model for liquidity constraints and quantity constraints on
labor supply. Section 4 discusses the econometric speciﬁcation of the model and Section 5 presents
the empirical results, reviews diagnostic tests performed on the estimated models, and contrasts
with the previous literature. These results pertain to dynamic models for the discrete events of
whether or not a household is liquidity constrained and whether or not household heads are subject
to quantity restrictions in their labor supply behavior. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A provides
technical details on the method of Maximum Smoothly Simulated Likelihood. Appendix B discusses
additional details on the recoding of the data.
22 Qualitative Aspects of Employment and Liquidity Constraints:
Evidence from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
Our primary data source is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics [Hill (1992)], PSID for short. The
full details of our recoding of the data are given in Appendix B. We originally worked with two
diﬀerent samples, all heads and male heads. The sample of all heads contains 46,031 observations
on 3,206 separate household spells. The sample of male heads contains 32,408 observations on
2,410 separate household spells. We have chosen to focus on the sample of male heads because it
is substantially more homogeneous than that of all heads. We report summary statistics for key
variables in Table 1 below. Tables 2–5 report additional aspects of the data, which we discuss
in further detail below. Even within such a homogeneous sample, all key dynamic aspects of the
data that pertain to regime switching display a fair amount of hitherto unexplored richness. The
regression results, reported in Tables 6–7 and discussed in Section 5 below, were obtained with the
sample of male heads.3
An overview of the pattern of transitions and the underlying dynamics of regime switching
observed in the data may be obtained by looking at cross-tabulations for the transitions from
being constrained to unconstrained and vice versa, given in Tables 2–5. A household is classi-
ﬁed as liquidity-constrained in a particular time period if its total wealth (the sum of reported
housing wealth and calculated nonhousing wealth) is low relative to its reported typical disposable
income. See Appendix B, section 8.1, for precise deﬁnitions and details. Section 8.2 discusses the
construction of the labour constraint indicators with the aid of ﬂowcharts appearing on pp.48-49.
Under the adopted deﬁnitions, in the sample of male heads approximately 72% of the observa-
tions are associated with unconstrained households and the remainder are constrained. As reported
in Table 2, of the households with male heads approximately 53% remain unconstrained in two suc-
cessive periods, 21% move from constrained to unconstrained, and 17% move from unconstrained
to constrained.
Table 3 shows that about 85% of household observations in the sample of male heads exhibit
a switch to a diﬀerent liquidity constraint regime at least once during the period of observation,
3The above number of 32,408 observations on 2,410 household spells with male heads used in the estimations,
includes observations with missing values ﬁlled-in; continuous variables were ﬁlled in by individual time-means and
discrete ones by most likely individual values.
3and nearly 14% switch 10 times or more. Furthermore, more than 98% of the sample changes
employment state at least once, and about 35% exhibit 10 or more such transitions. These numbers
justify our argument that the dynamics of regime switching need to be investigated properly when
working with long panel data sets.
We also have found a rich pattern in dynamics that characterizes transitions over diﬀerent
states of qualitative aspects of employment. Table 4 reports one-period transitions in terms of
four categories (cells) of qualitative aspects of employment. About 63% of households with male
heads are voluntarily employed in a given period and more than half of this fraction (38% overall)
remain voluntarily employed in the subsequent period. An additional 5% percent are classiﬁed as
overemployed, and the remainder are underemployed (17%), unemployed (2%) and out of the labor
force (13%).
Cross-tabulations between labor supply status and liquidity constraint regime, reported in Ta-
ble 5, strongly suggest substantial contemporaneous correlation between the respective indicators.
According to Table 5, only less than a quarter of voluntarily employed households face a binding
liquidity constraint, and only slightly more than a ﬁfth of overemployed ones are constrained on
the liquidity side. In sharp constrast, 42% of underemployed and 58% of unemployed individuals
are so constrained.
We conclude that the data do support a potential joint dependence of being liquidity constrained
upon the qualitative state of employment and of the qualitative state of employment upon being
liquidity constrained. The presence of unemployment, contemporaneously or in earlier years, may
accentuate, in and of its own, the propensity of a worker to be liquidity constrained, as suggested
by the cross-tabulations of Table 5. Hence, we turn to a model that addresses these aspects of
individual behavior.
3 Life Cycle Optimization with Liquidity and Other Quantity
Constraints
We develop a behavioral model where time is discrete, lifetime horizon is of ﬁnite length T, and
lifetime utility is additively separable across periods. Utility per period depends on consumption
4and leisure. Let ht denote hours worked per year, the endowment of leisure be normalized to 1,
¯ Lt = 1; Wt denote the hourly wage rate, Gt consumption (other than leisure), PGt its price, and
Pt the full price vector, Pt = (Wt;PGt). Direct utility per period is written as u(h;G): Extension
to the case of a vector of consumption goods is obvious. We assume both consumption good and
leisure to be normal. We simplify further by setting PGt = 1, and by letting the real wage, Wt,
be the sole source of uncertainty. The real wage is assumed to be independently and identically
distributed over time. There exists a single riskless asset with a constant rate of return r, satisfying
r ¸ ¡1.
To the direct utility per period function u(h;G) there corresponds an indirect utility function
v(b;W); where b denotes asset decumulation, b = G¡Wh: Let fNt t = 0;1;:::g denotes uncertainty,
in the form of a stochastic process with well-deﬁned transition probabilities; Nt denotes new infor-
mation the household receives at time t. Deﬁne N t = fN0;N1;:::;Ntg; to be the information state
as of time t, which comprises the set of past realizations of all of exogenous state variables, in this
case just Wt, and of the endogenous (but predetermined) state variables, in this case just beginning
of period t assets, At. A standard statement of the consumer lifetime optimization problem4 is














subject to the constraint
bt = Gt ¡ Wtht; (2)
and At+1 = (1 + r)(At ¡ bt): Period t decisions are made after Wt has been observed.
3.1 Liquidity Constraints
Unlike the classic treatment [Deaton (1991)] of the liquidity–constrained problem with beginning
of period t assets At; as the single decision variable, we may ﬁx ideas for our model by using at
least two state variables (At;Wt) : Wt is an exogenous state variable; At is an endogenous one.
4This statement of the problem follows MaCurdy (1983) and constitutes a multidimensional version of the problem
addressed by Altonji (1986), Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985), and MaCurdy (1983). Our estimation approach
adopts elements of Blundell and Walker (1982).
5We introduce a liquidity constraint, that is individuals may not hold negative ﬁnancial wealth
at the end of period t; in a “canonical” form5
At ¡ bt ¸ 0; t = 1;:::;T: (3)
It follows that relative to Deaton, op. cit., the presence of leisure in the utility function implies
ceteris paribus that the optimal decision is a function of assets and the real wage. This is a special
case of the problem handled by Hajivassiliou and Ioannides (1996), who show that the optimal

















That is, marginal utility is a supermartingale (with a drift). In the inﬁnite horizon case, the solution
is of the form b = b(A;W), which is associated with a threshold value of At, ˜ A(Wt), such that the
optimal net asset decumulation has the form:
bt = At; At < ˜ A(Wt); (5)
bt = B(At;Wt);qquadAt ¸ ˜ A(Wt): (6)
Equ. (5)–(6) deﬁne a threshold value of assets as the value of A, ˜ A(W), for which the two terms
in the RHS of (4) are equal to one another. Assets above this value imply that the individual is
unconstrained; otherwise, the individual is constrained. See Hajivassiliou and Ioannides (1996) for
more details.
It is straightforward to extend this model so as to deﬁne Gt as expenditure on a vector of
consumption goods other than leisure with a price vector PGt: In that case, indirect utility per
period reﬂects the additional parameters, v[bt;Wt;PGtjNt]: With additive time separability, the
problem admits a two-stage budgeting structure [c.f., Blundell and Walker (1986)]. Once bt is
known, labor supply and commodity demands in period t are obtained from Roy’s identity.
Our econometric analysis handles liquidity constraints by means of a liquidity constraint indi-
cator, a single endogenous variable representing the discrete event of whether or not an individual
is liquidity constrained:
St ´ S(At;Wt;PGt;N t) = 1[ ˜ A(Wt;PGt;N t) ¡ At ¸ 0]; (7)
5See Clarida (1987) and Zeldes (1989a). Deaton (1991) includes in the deﬁnition the value of the endowment of
leisure in period t:
6where the indicator function 1[C] is equal to 1; if condition C is true, and to 0; otherwise.
3.2 Quantity Constraints on Labor Supply
We extend formally the life cycle optimization problem (1) subject to (2) and (3), so as to allow
for exogenous restrictions on labor supply. Such an extension may be interpreted as a dynamic
generalization of Ashenfelter (1980). It is motivated by the availability, within the PSID data, of
answers to a number of questions that we interpret as pertaining to voluntary versus involuntary
aspects of employment. Appendix B provides details on how we recoded the PSID information in
order to measure unemployment, underemployment, or overemployment.
Let us consider, in particular, that the consumer believes his labor supply must satisfy a sequence
of constraints
ht · hRUt; t = 0;1;:::;T; (8)
hROt · ht; t = 0;1;:::;T; (9)
with probability one. Quantity constraint (8) may be used to represent involuntary unemployment
or underemployment. Quantity constraint (9) may be used to represent, symmetrically, involuntary
overemployment. We abstract from the labor force participation decision, which of course would
introduce an additional qualitative employment state.
When compared to liquidity constraints (3), quantity constraints (8)–(9) may have an even
better claim to possessing a strong “Keynesian” ﬂavor. We think of hRUt and hROt as representing
demand for an individual’s labor in his local labor market. Likely determinants are various cyclical
factors and, in addition, such factors as the local unemployment rate, the diﬀerence between the
number of applicants and vacancies in an individual’s labor market, the unemployment rate in an
individual’s (one-digit) occupation, and regional dummies, all variables that are available in the
PSID. However, Ham (1986) notes that the eﬀect on a worker of demand shocks to an industry or
a region may depend on his characteristics and various human capital variables, which, following
others, we include in the model as determinants of labor supply behavior.6
6Card (1994), however, argues that Keynesian-style labor market constraints are not indispensable for rationalizing
Ham’s ﬁndings on the importance of demand factors. He suggests instead that individuals may decide on their labor
supply at a higher frequency time unit than the year (for which data are available) and that there may be signiﬁcant
ﬁxed costs on either the worker’s side or the employer’s side of the labor market. We do not test for such eﬀects.
7We denote the solution for the unconstrained (notional) labor supply from problem (1), subject
to all constraints, conditionally upon St, by ht = H(At;Wt;PGt;N tjSt): As this is a function of
assets, following MaCurdy (1983) we may refer to it as the pseudo labor supply function. An
employment state indicator may now be deﬁned in terms of the pseudo labor supply function as
follows:
E(Pt;N tjSt) = ¡1; if ht = hROt ¸ H(At;Wt;PGt;N tjSt); (10)
E(Pt;N tjSt) = 0; if hROt < H(At;Wt;PGt;N tjSt) < hRUt; (11)
E(Pt;N tjSt) = 1; if ht = hRUt · H(At;Wt;PGt;N tjSt); (12)
Appendix B links this deﬁnition with all categories available in the data, so as to take advantage
of their full detail. It is an important feature of our model, which readily follows from the deﬁnition
of Et; that lends itself to an ordered discrete-choice formulation.
It is helpful to try and visualize the determination of the employment state indicator in a static-
equivalent setting. We note that once the period t net asset decumulation bt has been determined,
we may refer to a standard consumption-leisure choice diagram, such as in Figure 1. Given prices
and net asset decumulation, the position of the “budget line” is determined. Furthermore, given
parameters and values for the observables and unobservables, a particular individual who is in the
labor force, may be in one of three categories. An individual may be of type V, in which case
employment is determined according to point VT, and the individual is voluntarily employed. We
note that in this case hRO · h · hRU. Alternatively, an individual may be of type U, i.e., one who
wishes to work according to point UT. He may not, however, work as much as he wishes because
of the underemployment constraint hRU. In such a case, employment is determined according to
point UR, and the individual is involuntarily underemployed (or unemployed) working hRU hours.
Finally, an individual may be of type O, i.e., one who wishes to work according to point OT. Such an
individual may not, however, be able to work as little as he wishes because of the overemployment
constraint hRO. In such a case employment is determined according to point OR, and the individual
is involuntarily overemployed, working hRO hours.7
7If it may be assumed that the notional labor supply function is locally monotonic with no backward bending
portion, the deﬁnition of Et may be alternatively stated in terms of wage comparisons. In fact, such a deﬁnition may
be more appropriate, given that hRU; and hRO are actually not observed.
8An appropriate analytical representation of this choice problem requires that it always be the
case that hRUt ¸ hROt, which we impose econometrically. The economic intuition of this assumption
is straightforward. The maximum amount an individual is allowed to work must not be less than
the minimum.
In view of the discussion of the determinants of hRUt and hROt above, we would expect that an
upturn in the business cycle would increase the magnitudes of both of the constraining quantities.
This would cause the overemployment constraint to become tighter and the underemployment one
to be relaxed. Both those outcomes accord with economic intuition.
The general problem of dynamic consumption decisions subject to quantity constraints belongs
to a class of decision problems with mixed discrete-continuous decisions whose estimation has been
discussed by Pakes (1994) and Rust (1994). However, it is important to note that even though in
the present paper we are interested only in the estimation of a discrete dynamic decision problem,
the original problem is not reducible in terms of discrete decisions only, and a statement of the full
dynamic programming problem is called for. We eschew, for reasons of brevity, additional details
of the problem, and refer to our earlier working paper Hajivassiliou and Ioannides (1994). We
instead propose an estimation model for the vector of endogenous variables (St;Et); deﬁned in (7)
and (10)–(12). Our approach admits as special cases some of the problems examined by several
previous researchers, including in particular Ball (1990) and Zeldes (1989a), whose contributions
we discuss in detail in Section 5.5 below.
In lieu of a complete treatment, a number of remarks are in order. First, if an individual in
a particular period is unconstrained with respect to either liquidity or employment, anticipation
of constraints’ possibly binding some time in the future are reﬂected in current decisions through
the conditional value functions V
s;e
t ; deﬁned as the optimal value of remaining lifetime utility,
conditional on fs;eg.8 Intuitively, to the extent that constraints (3), (8) and (9) ever bind, they
would aﬀect total lifetime resources.
Second, in spite of considerable research eﬀorts during the last few years, structural estimation
of a general mixed discrete continuous model like ours has run up against insurmountable, at
8For the usefulness of the conditional valuation function, see Hotz and Miller (1993) and Rust (1987; 1988). They
allow the dynamic discrete choice problem to be transformed to an equivalent but static one; the conditional valuation
functions play the role of values of a static utility associated with discrete alternative courses of action.
9present, computational diﬃculties.9 It is for this reason that we pursue estimation of approximate
reduced form aspects of the problem.
Third, the functional form of the optimal solution for bt as a function of state variables does
depend upon whether or not the individual is constrained with respect to either liquidity or em-
ployment or both. This dependence is, in turn, transmitted to commodity demands and to labor
supply, a fact that we exploit in specifying our estimation models in Section 4 below.
4 Econometric Models
4.1 Simultaneous Determination of Liquidity and Employment Constraint In-
dicators
We shall aim in this paper at estimating the parameters of the two discrete endogenous variables,
deﬁned by (7) and (10)–(12), as functions of observable characteristics of the decision maker and
his environment, while allowing for dynamics. We do so by introducing state dependence, via
the dependent variable’s own lagged values as regressors. In addition, we allow contemporaneous
spillover and lagged spillover eﬀects from one to the other endogenous variable. All of our models
are jointly estimated as systems of discrete decisions that allow for unobservable persistent het-
erogeneity in the stochastic structures, while imposing so-called “coherency conditions” required
for logical and statistical validity of our models. Even though the individual decisions may be
estimated as reduced-forms, the model of Section 3 allows them to be construed in quasi-structural
forms also, by means of the conditional value functions as we shall see shortly. That is, the em-
ployment indicator Et may be deﬁned conditionally on St; which makes the model consistent with
the two-stage budgeting setting of Blundell and Walker (1986), and vice versa for the liquidity
constraint indicator, conditional on the employment indicator. To the extent that the discrete
indicators may not be perfectly observed in our data, the stochastic shocks in the respective mod-
els may be interpreted as consisting partly of an observation error. The implications of this are
discussed below.
9There are no breakthroughs in the mixed discrete-continuous decision problems comparable to Rust (1988) and
to Hotz and Miller (1993) for purely discrete decisions. See Pakes (1994) and Rust (1994).
104.2 General Unordered Reduced Forms
We assume for simplicity linear functional forms for the conditional valuation functions for indi-
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it ; s 2 f0;1g;e 2 f¡1;0;1g; (13)
where Ψ
s;e
it are vectors of polynomial functions of explanatory variables, which might include lagged
values of endogenous variables, ¯se is a corresponding vector of parameters, and ²
s;e
it are random
variables that correspond to the unobserved components of utility at time t:
Once we have assumed a particular stochastic structure for the ²
s;e
it s, we may use (13) to estimate
the model. This speciﬁcation yields a six-nomial model, as becomes evident immediately below.
As an example, the probability that an individual is observed voluntarily employed and liquidity
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The likelihood of this event may be written in terms of the probability distribution functions of
the "se
it s, while allowing for the presence of lagged endogenous variables among the Ψs. Since the
²se
it s are unobserved components of the state vector [Rust (1988)], it is appropriate to treat them as
unobservable random shocks, which may reﬂect individual heterogeneity. Given the state of the art
in estimating dynamic discrete choice models, a fairly general assumption we can make is to treat
them as random eﬀects with a time-invariant component and an AR(1) component to the general
error term.
Speciﬁcally, we assume the "
s;e










i s are time-invariant random individual eﬀects and the ³
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it s are random variables independently and identically distributed over time with
means equal to zero, and a 6 £ 6 variance-covariance matrix. This implies a Ti £ 6-dimensional
correlated vector for observation i: In general, because the limited dependent variables in this
model are purely discrete, to achieve identiﬁcation one needs to normalize the conditional valuation
functions of one of the six outcomes to zero. Hence, the parameters that can be estimated are as
follows: ﬁve of the six parameter vectors ¯se in (13), fourteen (= 5 £ 6=2 ¡ 1) elements of the
contemporaneous variance-covariance matrix of the »
s;e
it s in (16), ﬁfteen (= 5 £ 6=2) elements of
the contemporaneous variance-covariance matrix of the ´
s;e




Thus, consideration of all possible liquidity and labor supply constraints leads to switching
regressions, with switching occurring in two dimensions: one, on account of liquidity constraints;
two, on account of quantity constraints on labor supply. The introduction of exogenous constraints
on labor supply augments the number of the possible regimes in a given period from two, in the case
of liquidity constraints alone, to six. Thus, the number of possible outcomes corresponds to the six
possibilities deﬁned by ff0;1g £ f1;0;¡1gg.10 This may be handled as a system of simultaneous
discrete response models, corresponding to the discrete events (St;Et). In practice, of course, not
all regimes will be equally important, an issue that is settled by the data.
4.3 Quasi-Structural Form Models with Ordering
The model we developed above does suggest a more speciﬁc (and thus testable) stochastic structure,
namely one involving two discrete endogenous variables that jointly generate six regimes with
a set of implied restrictions, namely that the employment state indicator is naturally ordered.
Of those endogenous variables, the liquidity constraint indicator, St, introduced in (7), may be
handled by means of dynamic probit model. On the other hand, the employment state indicator
Et; deﬁned by (10)–(12), suggests that it be modelled as an ordered probit model. Section 5.1
below describes the binary probit part of our model, which assumes that a binary regime indicator
for St is perfectly observable for every household in every period. The second part of our model,
which assumes a perfectly observed employment state indicator Et is available, is a dynamic ordered
10If the status of being out of the labor force (voluntarily unemployed) is included and underemployment is distin-
guished from unemployment we would have ten states.
12probit model and is discussed in section 5.2. Joint estimation of these two models, discussed in
section 5.3, allows for interactions between liquidity-constrained behavior and qualitative aspects of
employment behavior and combines the above dynamic probit and ordered probit sides. Speciﬁcally,
the likelihood of unemployment is allowed to be aﬀected by an individual’s being constrained in
the labor market.
We highlight the fact that the ordered probit model may be nested in the classical sense into
the general unrestricted hexa-nomial model introduced in subsection 4.2 above. It is simpler to
show this if we concentrate on the labor employment indicator Et and drop the time subscript. We
then have that:
Prob[E = 0] = Prob["0 ¡ "¡1 ¸ Ψ¡1¯¡1 ¡ Ψ0¯0; "0 ¡ "1 ¸ Ψ1¯1 ¡ Ψ0¯0]:
By deﬁning "0
1 ´ "1 ¡ "0 and "0
¡1 ´ "¡1 ¡ "0, the above probability may be written in terms of the
bivariate distribution function: Prob[E = 0] = Prob["0
¡1 · Ψ¡1;1¯¡1;1; "0
1 · Ψ1;1¯1;1]. It follows
that this setup is equivalent to an ordered probit model in terms of a single underlying random
variable, "0
¡1, if and only if "0
¡1 ´ ¡"0
1 (which implies "1 ´ "¡1), and provided that, in addition, the
following conditions are satisﬁed: ﬁrst, the variable components of Ψ¡1;1¯¡1;1 and Ψ1;1¯1;1 have
coeﬃcients which are opposite to one another (i.e., their variable components sum up to 0); and
second, their intercepts diﬀer. These testable restrictions are discussed in subsection 5.4 below.
There is a simple way to view the hexa-nomial model in relation to the simultaneous system
composed of the binary probit and the ordered probit model. Referring to Figure 2, a constellation
of six cells is deﬁned by the outcomes ff0;1g £ f1;0;¡1gg. The hexa-nomial model determines
which of the six regimes prevails comparing functions of regressors and parameters against draws
of six random variables, without reference to any ordering. In contrast, the simultaneous system
composed of the binary probit and the ordered probit model orders the outcomes on the employment
margin and describes them by two underlying random variables.
4.4 The Problem of Imperfections in the Liquidity and Employment Constraint
Indicators
Our assumption that the binary regime indicator for liquidity constraints St and the ordered em-
ployment indicator Et are perfectly observable, while serving well to illustrate our basic approach, is
13problematic in its most general setting, especially with respect to St. A particular threshold amount
of ﬁnancial assets ˜ Ait, which depends on individual characteristics as well as market variables but
is not observed directly, was identiﬁed by our approach as determining switching of regimes for Sit,
as exempliﬁed by Figure 2. It is holding assets Ait exceeding the threshold level that signiﬁes that
the household is not subject to a borrowing constraint in a particular period t.11
One could consider generalizing our econometric model to allow for an imperfect indicator, Jit,
specifying whether or not liquidity constraints are binding, based on Iait+1, the observed value
of asset income for household i at the beginning of period t + 1. Since typically assets vary in
their liquidity characteristics, which are unobservable, the procedure we (and many others before
us) have used to impute asset stocks is at best imperfect. It is, therefore, important to account
for implied imperfections in the regime indicators and thus allow for misclassiﬁcation [c.f., Lee
and Porter (1984)]. One approach would be to allow for random coding errors in the equations
deﬁning the regime indicators. This model, in contrast to the Lee and Porter (1984) formulation,
allows the probability of misclassiﬁcation to vary endogenously and to be determined by economic
fundamentals. Such coding errors, however, would not aﬀect the consistency up to scale of the
discrete estimation procedures we adopt here that assumes perfect regime indicators, provided
they are IID.
An alternative approach would be to model directly the stochastic relation between the imperfect
(Jt) and perfect (St) indicators, through a distribution function F(StjJt). In this paper we proceed
to assume that the regime classiﬁcation information is either perfect (i.e., St = Jt) or that possible
imperfections in it do not aﬀect the consistency up to scale of the estimators for the discrete models
we consider here. We take up a detailed analysis of the possible misclassiﬁcation issue elsewhere in
a paper in progress.
5 Main Estimation Models and Empirical Results
The discrete response system (7) and (10)–(12) is modelled by a generalized limited dependent vari-
ables model consisting of simultaneous binary probit and ordered probit parts. Since households
11Of course, this would not be an issue if respondents were asked speciﬁcally about whether they felt they had
been constrained, which is in fact the case with the 1983 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances. This event is
not observed, however, in our data.
14must adapt their behavior to the presence of constraints on asset holdings and on labor supply,
the path of the regime indicators [St;Et] is endogenous. Zeldes (1989a), who works with food
consumption only, does not deal with switching. Neither do Altonji (1986) and Ball (1990), who
work with food consumption and labor supply data, nor Ham (1986), who uses only labor supply
data.12 Given speciﬁc assumptions about the distribution of the unobservables, this endogeneity
can be analyzed by maximum simulated likelihood estimation methods. In this paper we make a
descriptive ﬁrst cut and proceed with estimating joint models for St and Et. We note, nonethe-
less, that our conditional quasi-structural reduced form approach is ﬁrmly rooted in the theory of
Markovian decision problems.
It is instructive to highlight the interaction between the liquidity and labor supply constraint
indicators, St and Et, by considering structural forms for the pair of two endogenous variables
[St;Et] as a system. Consider ﬁrst models for [St;Et] symmetrically deﬁned with dummy endoge-
nous variables and general state dependence as follows:
Sit = BP(S¤




it) ´ OP(°21Ei;t¡1 + °22Ei;t¡2 + ·0Sit + ·1Si;t¡1 + ·2Si;t¡2 + Xit¯op + "
op
it ); (18)
where BP and OP denote binary probit and ordered probit functions, respectively. In a static
version of our setting, coherency conditions [Schmidt (1981)] reduce to conditions that the model
be recursive, that is the coeﬃcients ±0 and ·0 in (17–18) satisfy ±0 ¢ ·0 = 0. See Appendix A,




it in (17)–(18) is
of particular interest, because the presence of unemployment may accentuate the propensity of an
individual to be liquidity constrained even after conditioning on all observable information.
In the remainder of the paper we report and discuss estimation results for the system of quasi-















it j½bpj < 1 (19)
12Zeldes (1989a) assumes that regimes are perfectly observable and uses only data for the unconstrained group in
the estimations. If, as expected, regimes are endogenously determined, his procedure will give unreliable inferences.
Altonji (1986) excludes constrained individuals. Ball’s approach diﬀers from Zeldes’ only in his using jointly food
consumption and labor supply data. Ham (1986)’s use of dummy endogenous variables to account for the impact
of constraints is less general than ours, but his separation of underemployment from unemployment is noteworthy,





















i are time-invariant unobservable characteristics of household i assumed to be Gaus-
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i are allowed to be correlated with the regressors Xit in a time-invariant fashion.





i on regressors as E(´
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i jX1t;¢¢¢;XiTi) = ¯ Xi:µbp and E(´
op
i jX1t;¢¢¢;XiTi) = ¯ Xi:µop.
This device introduces ¯ Xi: as additional regressors in S¤
it and E¤
it in (17)–(18). Assuming that
the errors have a non-scalar variance-covariance structure conditional on all explanatory variables
including lagged dependent variables is often done to express coexistence of state dependence and
heterogeneity, as in Heckman (1981), or to express impact of habits, as in Hotz et al. (1988).
The full stochastic structure we assume here implies that we do not need to instrument for the
lagged dependent variables, but do need to specify the distribution of the initial conditions. Our
MSSL/GHK estimation procedure incorporates fully these features. See Appendix A for more
details.13
Next, we summarize the models that we estimate. It is pretty clear that univariate probit models
for [Sit;Eit] are fully dominated by the bivariate ones. We do not report the univariate results for
reasons of brevity, but present diagnostics to that eﬀect. Columns (a) of Tables 6i and 7i report
joint estimation of quasi-structural forms respectively for the liquidity constraint and employment
indicators, according to (17)–(18), under the restrictions ±0 = ±1 = ±2 = 0 and ·0 = ·1 = ·2 = 0
respectively, namely that neither contemporaneous, nor lagged spillover eﬀects are included from
the other constraint side of the model. Columns (b) of Tables 6i and 7i report a similar joint
13In such a setting, the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors does not necessarily imply a
contemporaneous correlation in every period. For example, as Heckman (1981) explains, it is still possible to assume
that conditional on the RHS variables the only residual correlation is through the random eﬀect plus its AR(1)
structure, as we have assumed. Our approach is considerably more general than Heckman’s in that it explicitly
allows for the unobservable heterogeneity eﬀects to be correlated with regressors in a time-invariant fashion.
16estimation after we further augment the dynamic structure by allowing for lagged spillover eﬀects
but not contemporaneous ones, that is, in terms of the system (17)–(18), under the restrictions
±0 = 0; and ·0 = 0; respectively. Finally, Columns (c) of Tables 6i and 7i report joint estimations of
the full set of quasi-structural forms that include both contemporaneous and lagged spillover eﬀects,
but always making sure to guarantee the coherency conditions. That is, column (c) of Table 6i
reports the results for quasi-structural form (17) for the liquidity constraint equation, estimated
jointly with a model for the employment constraints equation like the one reported in column (b)
of Table 7i, that is with the quasi-structural form (18) under the coherency condition ·0 = 0.
And, column (c) of Table 7i reports the results for quasi-structural form (18) for the employment
constraints equation, estimated jointly with a model for the liquidity constraint equation like the
one reported in column (b) of Table 6i, or alternatively put, with the quasi-structural form (17)
under the coherency condition ±0 = 0:
Three remarks are in order. First, we underscore that in our simulated maximum likelihood
estimation of models (17)–(18) with endogenous variables among the regressors, we make proper
allowance for the endogeneity of RHS variables whenever appropriate. A detailed explanation of
how we achieve this may be found in Appendix A, subsection 7.3. Second, our modelling of random
individual eﬀects allows that they be correlated with the explanatory variables in a time-invariant
fashion. See Hajivassiliou (2003) for details. Third, Appendix A focusses on the details of the
econometric methodology that we employ, while Appendix B gives details of data construction and
recodings.
5.1 Empirical Results: The Liquidity Constraint Side of the Model
Consider the results reported in Table 6i. These report estimations for the liquidity constraint
indicator Sit model, according to (17), jointly estimated with diﬀerent versions of the employment
constraint indicator Eit model, according to (18). The dependent variable Sit is measured by
a dummy variable identical to Zeldes’ “total wealth split” of the data into constrained (S = 1)
and unconstrained (S = 0) households — see Appendix B. The estimations of the employment
constraints models are discussed in subsection 5.2 below.
A time-invariant individual eﬀect is allowed in the form of a random eﬀect, and in addition, an
17AR(1) shock, in accordance with (19). The variance of the i.i.d. component in the AR(1) shock is
normalized to 1. The presence of the random eﬀect structure is statistically very signiﬁcant. The
coeﬃcients of most explanatory variables are also very signiﬁcant and generally have the expected
sign. The importance of the panel structure is conﬁrmed by comparing with estimations of a
homogeneous probit model with an identical set of explanatory variables restricted to have an i.i.d.
error structure (i.e., ¾bp
´ = 0 and ½
bp
AR = 0). This is the starting point for our estimations, but do
not report them here for reasons of brevity, except to note that a number of key coeﬃcients, e.g.,
that of the real rate of interest, have the wrong sign when the panel structure is ignored.
The results highlight the importance of the dynamic structure. The lagged values of all endoge-
nous variables are always very signiﬁcant and imply substantial state dependence. The autoregres-
sive correlation coeﬃcient ½
bp
AR is estimated to be 0.68 with an asymptotic t-statistic of 11.8. The
standard deviation of the random eﬀect ´
bp
i , ¾bp
´i, is also statistically signiﬁcant, with a t-statistic




it ); whose estimate is 0.43 and its t-statistic is 18.2. The estimated
coeﬃcients for the two lags of the endogenous variable Si;t¡1 and Si;t¡2; which are included in the
regression, are 1.12 and .15, and their t-statistics are 38.9 and 5.04, respectively. Both those eﬀects
and the sign of the autocorrelation coeﬃcient suggest a high degree of persistence in the likelihood
of being liquidity constrained.
The lagged endogenous variables for overemployment and for under- or unemployment in the
previous two periods, respectively, are not included in the regression we report in column (a) but
are included in the ones reported in columns (b) and (c). They do not appear signiﬁcant and their
estimated coeﬃcients are numerically small, suggesting no substantial role for lagged spillovers from
the employment side.
The other regressors, denoted by Xit, include roughly speaking preferences, labor supply vari-
ables, and labor demand variables. Speciﬁcally, education, food needs (a PSID variable measuring
household composition, a weighted sum of the current ages of family members adjusted for total
family size), age, race, religion, marital status and the real rate of interest are included in the Xit
group. Several of these variables have also been used by Zeldes (1989a). Adding to the list, we
include such labor demand and supply variables as county unemployment, local labor market con-
ditions, unemployment rate in the household head’s occupation and of labor supply variables as job
18tenure, number of children below the age of ﬁve (in order to account for additional eﬀects from the
presence of young children, over and above what is accounted for in food needs), union membership
and being being disabled. Several of these variables were used by Ham (1982). Also included are
geographical dummies and three grouped wave dummies (summarizing the years 1976-9, 1980-3,
and 1984-7). A cubic structure for age is very signiﬁcant, implying a highly nonlinear negative
eﬀect of age upon the probability of being liquidity constrained. A higher real rate of interest is
associated with a higher probability of being constrained, exactly as expected. A household head’s
being black has a positive and very signiﬁcant eﬀect on that probability, and being married and
highly educated have very signiﬁcant negative eﬀects. All these results accord with intuition. Also
included in these regressions are 16 time-averages of all time-varying regressors. Their inclusion
is very signiﬁcant according to the Â2 statistics reported at the top of Table 6i.14 We discuss the
consequences of this ﬁnding in section 5.4 below.
Table 6ii reports the estimation results in the form of the estimated marginal eﬀects for the
estimated probability of being liquidity constrained with respect to the corresponding independent
variable, corresponding to the columns of Table 6i. The line marked ˆ Plc reports the marginal
eﬀects for implied probabilities for a hypothetical individual with independent variables taking
values equal to their sample means. There are seven columns of results. The ﬁrst column reports
the respective sample average value for each of the independent variables. The next two columns
pertain to the estimation reported in column (a), Table 6i, and give the marginal eﬀects of the
respective independent variable when the probability of being liquidity constraint is evaluated at
the sample means. For a continuous variable, this is the respective derivative. For a discrete
variable, this is the diﬀerence between the probability evaluated when the respective variable is
equal to 1 minus the probability evaluated when the respective variable is equal to 0. The columns
marked ∆¤ ˆ Plc report, respectively, the marginal eﬀect of each variable alone, @ ˆ Plc
@Xj ; and the ones
marked ∆¤¤ ˆ Plc; the marginal eﬀect of each variable paired with its time mean whenever appropriate,
@ ˆ Plc
@Xj + @ ˆ Plc
@ ¯ Xj : The respective elasticities may be computed readily. Obviously, ∆¤ and ∆¤¤ are
equal for variables entered above without their time average, which include all variables with
zero or low time variation. While several of the explanatory variables have substantial marginal
14The time invariant regressors are not included for the obvious reasons, nor are the wave dummies, which do not
exhibit much variability.
19eﬀects, the elasticities associated with the three age variables and the own lagged variables are
particularly noteworthy. Especially for the dummy variables, the marginal eﬀects have a very
intuitive interpretation. For example, reading from the ﬁrst two columns, an individual who was
liquidity constrained in the previous period has a probability higher by 0.30 of being constrained
now.15
5.2 The Labor Constraints Side of the Model
Table 7i reports estimation results for the ordered probit side of the model for an employment
indicator Eit as the dependent variable according to equations (17) and (18) for the sample of
male heads. This variable corresponds to the deﬁnition (10)–(12) for members of the labor force
only and its construction is discussed in subsection 8.2. We present in column (a) estimation
results for the quasi-structural form of the ordered probit side while ignoring all spillovers from the
liquidity constraint side, that is ·0 = ·1 = ·2: The next two columns, (b) and (c), include lagged
liquidity constraint spillovers; while column (b) excludes and column (c) includes contemporaneous
spillovers. The employment constraints equation is estimated jointly with the liquidity constraints
equation: column (b), table 7i, is estimated jointly with column (b), table 6i, and column (c), table
7i, is estimated jointly with table 6i(b) version so as to ensure the coherence condition holds.
We use data for members of the labor force only and do not distinguish econometrically the cases
of underemployment and unemployment. These closely reﬂect the ordering of outcomes according
to our theoretical model. The ordered probit side of the model with panel data is given by:
Eit = ¡1; if E¤
it < µ¡; overemployment
Eit = 0 µ¡ · if E¤
it · µ+; voluntary employment




it is deﬁned in (18). This part of the model estimates an intercept, a vector of unknown
coeﬃcients, and a stochastic structure deﬁned by (20), that includes the lower threshold µ¡; stan-
dard deviation of the time invariant component, ¾op











it ; the i.i.d. components of the stochastic
15We have also computed but do not report here the marginal eﬀects for implied probabilities for a hypothetical
individual with independent variables taking values equal to their sample means, alternatively the sample mean plus
the sample standard deviation, and alternatively the sample mean minus the sample standard deviation, respectively.
Not surprisingly, those probabilities vary nonlinearly with the standard deviation.
20structure of the binary probit and the ordered probit equations (19)-(20). The upper threshold,
µ+, is normalized at 0. We note that, analogously to ´
bp
i , we allow for the individual eﬀect ´
op
i to
be correlated with the explanatory variables in a time-invariant fashion.
Column (a) of Table 7i reports results for the counterpart for the employment constraints
equation of the liquidity constraint equation that is reported in column (a), Table 6i, when those
two equations are jointly considered. The panel structure is very signiﬁcant, as we have already
discussed in subsection 5.1 above: the models reported in the respective columns of Tables 6i and
7i, respectively, share the same panel structures.
Two lagged values of the indicator that a household head is involuntarily unemployed are
both very signiﬁcant, with estimated coeﬃcients of .70 and .37, and t¡statistics of 36.3 and 19.3,
respectively. Thus, being involuntarily unemployed makes one more likely to be so again in the
future. Dummies for being overemployed in the past have the opposite eﬀect and are also very
signiﬁcant. Also very signiﬁcant in Table 7i is the threshold µ¡ associated with involuntary under-
or unemployment relative to voluntary employment. This is negative, as it should be, given that
the upper threshold is normalized at 0: These ﬁndings strengthen an earlier but somewhat tentative
result by Clark and Summers (1982) on the importance of persistence elements in explaining cyclical
behavior in labor supply. These results imply a rich dynamic structure for the labor constraints
indicator. The model reported in Table 7i, column (b), diﬀers from that of column (a) only on
account of the inclusion of the two lags for the liquidity constraint indicator, one of which is
marginally signiﬁcant, although their inclusion is jointly signiﬁcant according to the Â2 test.
The remaining explanatory variables included in the regression coincide with those used by
Ham (1982). Of the regional dummies the one indicating residence in Western U.S. is highly
signiﬁcant. A cubic eﬀect for age is signiﬁcant and implies that age reduces the probability of
being underemployed. Similar and even more signiﬁcant is the eﬀect of job tenure on the likelihood
of being underemployed. Race and religion are signiﬁcant. Having a disabling health condition,
being male, a union member, and having many children all have very strong and statistically
important positive eﬀects. Collecting unemployment insurance and the imputed wage both have
numerically very small but statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects. Being married and being educated both
have very signiﬁcant and negative eﬀects. A set of variables representing demand eﬀects all have
21very signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. Higher values of the unemployment rate in the county of residence and
in the occupation of the household head imply higher values for the likelihood of underemployment
or unemployment. With a few exceptions, these results accord with intuition. They do imply
a persistent and possibly “trapping” eﬀect caused by past unemployment and underemployment.
Similarly to the liquidity constraint model, also included in these regressions are 16 time-averages
of all time-varying regressors. Their inclusion is signiﬁcant according to the Â2 statistics reported
at the top of Table 7i and we discuss the consequences of this ﬁnding in section 5.4 below. Finally,
Table 7ii presents estimates of marginal eﬀects of the counterpart for the employment constraints
equation. Their interpretation is exactly analogous to that of Table 6i, discussed in section 5.1.
5.3 Quasi-Structural Form Models for Liquidity Constraints and Labor Supply
Constraints
Let us now focus on columns (c) of Tables 6i and 7i, which report joint estimation results for quasi-
structural forms for Sit and Eit as a system taking into account the full possibility of the lagged
and contemporaneous spillover eﬀects across the two sides of the models, while always imposing
the coherency conditions discussed above. Column (c), Table 6i, reports results for equation (17)
estimated jointly with (18) with the restriction ·0 = 0 imposed. Intuitively speaking, column (b),
Table 7i, reports the results for an equation determining the marginal probability for Eit; column
(c), Table 6i, reports results for an equation determining the probability for Sit; conditional on Eit:
Using analogous intuition, column (c), Table 7i, reports results for equation (18) estimated jointly
with (17), with the coherency condition ±0 = 0; and whose results are reported on column (b),
Table 6i. In like manner, column (b), Table 6i, reports the results for an equation determining the
marginal probability for Sit;andcolumn (c), Table 7i, reports results for an equation determining
the probability for Eit; conditional on Sit:
Inclusion of contemporaneous spillover eﬀects, that is inclusion of Eit in the liquidity constraint
equation for Sit; and alternatively of Sit in the employment constraints equation for Eit; is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant according to the likelihood ratio test.16 It is crucial to remember that the
contemporaneous spillovers are included in turn and not simultaneously, since that would have
16The Eit spillover eﬀect was decomposed into its two constrained parts, overemployment (Eit = ¡1) and un-
der/unemployment (Eit = 1).
22violated the coherency of the model. The models reported in columns (c), Table 6i, and (b), Table
7i, have a joint loglikelihood function of ¡29;401:4 versus ¡29;422:7 for columns (b), Table 7i,
and (b), Table 6i. Similarly, the models reported in columns (c), Table 7i, and (b), Table 6i, have
a joint loglikelihood function of ¡29;406:3 versus ¡29;422:7 for columns (b), Table 7i, and (b),
Table 6i, jointly. So, the simultaneous equations system passes the likelihood ratio tests.
This approach accounts for the joint determination of Sit and Eit while imposing the coherency
condition, ·0 = 0 and ±0 = 0; respectively for the two models. In Appendix A, subsection 7.3
we explain how we handle the presence of endogenous variables on the right hand side in these
speciﬁcations through the use of Maximum Simulated Likelihood in conjunction with the GHK
simulator.17 Particularly noteworthy is our estimation of the autoregressive structure and con-




it ); the error structure of equ. (17) and (18), detailed in (19)
and (20), as well as allowance for individual eﬀects and regressors being possibly correlated in a
time-invariant fashion.
All of the components of the stochastic panel structure are estimated to be very signiﬁcant
for both models. Interestingly, the standard deviation for the random eﬀect ¾bp
´i in the liquidity
constraint equation varies imperceptibly across the various models but ¾op
´i does vary in the case
of the structural form. The respective correlation coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly smaller in the case of





estimate of the former is much larger than the latter. The estimated correlation coeﬃcient declines
as we move to the right on both tables. In moving from columns (a), Tables 6i and 7i, to columns
(b) of Tables 6i and 7i, the lagged dependent variables of the employment constraints indicator
are added to the liquidity constraint equation and those of the liquidity constraint indicator to the
employment equation. This reduces the contemporaneous correlation as expected. And similarly
moving from columns (b), Tables 6i and 7i, to columns (c) of the same tables, contemporaneous
spillover eﬀects are added in turn as required to guarantee the conherency conditions.
We see from column (c), Table 6i, that being unemployed has a strong positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the likelihood of being liquidity constrained. Being overemployed is not signiﬁcant. The
17The exclusion restrictions for the liquidity constraint model follow Zeldes (1989a), except that we include in
addition quadratic and cubic eﬀects for the age variable, marital status, geographical dummies, race and religion.
This list follows quite closely results that Zeldes discusses but does not report in his paper.
23lagged values of both those variables are actually not statistically signiﬁcant. Most of the deter-
minants of being liquidity constrained remain signiﬁcant in the structural form too, as do the own
lagged dependent variables. Being black is associated with higher likelihood of being constrained,
while being other nonwhite, e.g., Asian, a lower one.
The two right most columns of Table 6ii report elasticities of estimated marginal eﬀects for the
liquidity constraint equation of the joint model. Reading across we see that the implied probabilities
generally diﬀer little between the restricted and the full quasi-structural form models.
Turning now to the likelihood of being underemployed or unemployed,18 we see that being
liquidity constrained has a very signiﬁcant positive eﬀect, and so do the own lagged values of the
variables expressing being overemployed, which have negative eﬀects, and unemployed, which have
positive eﬀects. Most of the determinants of the likelihood of being underemployed retain their
signiﬁcance. Unemployment rate in the county of residence and in the occupation of the head of
household, and tightness of local labor market conditions19 are all very signiﬁcant and with signs in
accord with intuition. Being nonwhite is associated with higher likelihood of being underemployed
or unemployed.
Finally, we note that the inclusion of the endogenous variable expressing the employment con-
straints indicator as an explanatory variable for the liquidity constraint indicator and of the en-
dogenous variable expressing the liquidity constraint indicator as an explanatory variable for the
employment constraints indicator are each signiﬁcant in terms of the likelihood ratio test. This
follows from comparing the loglikelihoods from columns (b) and (c) in both Tables 6i and 7i. The
respective diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant according to the standard Â2 test.
5.4 Diagnostics
We report at the top of each column of Tables 6ii and 7ii various probability predictions and
data proportions of selected regimes. In Table 6ii, the binary probit side estimates are used to
construct the predicted probability of being liquidity constrained at the sample means, ˆ Plc( ¯ X), the
average predicted probability ˆ Plc, and the percentage of observations that have positive predicted
18The exclusion restrictions for this model follow Ham, op. cit..
19This categorical variable measures tightness of the local labor market for unskilled workers, with values ranging
from 1, for good conditions, to 5, for bad conditions.
24latent values for the liquidity constraint indicator 1(xitˆ ¯bp > 0). Finally, we give the percentage of
observations correctly predicted by our models (in terms of the predicted indicator 1(¢) ) matching
the observed liquidity constraint indicator.
In Table 7ii we present the analogous results obtained from the ordered probit employment side,
by focussing on the two regimes with binding constraints, namely [Eit = ¡1 ´ involuntary overemployment]
and [Eit = 1 ´ involuntary underemployment or unemployment]. Probability predictions are de-
noted by ˆ Pov and ˆ Pun respectively, and regime predictions by 1(ˆ µ¡ < xitˆ ¯op) and 1(ˆ µ+ > xitˆ ¯op)
respectively.
Our estimation results suggest remarkably good ﬁts. Speciﬁcally, the percentages of correctly
predicted values are 88% for the Sit = 1 event, 81% for Eit = ¡1, and 94% for Eit = 1, while the
mean predicted values match almost exactly their respective observed sample means.
Additional information on how well our models ﬁt the data is provided by Figures 3 and 4,
where we have plotted predicted probabilities over time using our model estimates. Calculations
based on columns (a) and (c) of Tables 6i and 7i are contrasted to those based columns (c). We note
that the year-by-year predictions vary cyclically and conform rather well to the historical economic
facts business cycle timing of the US economy for the period under study.
More speciﬁcally, Figure 3 compares the time variation in the predicted probabilities of be-
ing liquidity constrained based on version (a) of the model (neither lagged nor contemporaneous
spillover eﬀects from the employment side), to those obtained from version (c) (with full employ-
ment spillovers). The version (c) estimates allow us to obtain predictions for the hypothetical case
that all individuals were ivoluntarily under- or unemployed, suggesting that in such a case the
probability of a binding liquidity constraint would rise by an additional 10%. Figure 4 presents the
results of performing an analogous exercise for the employment constraints side of the model. In
that case, the impact of a binding liquidity constraint spilling over to the employment constraints
side is slightly more modest: the predicted probabilities of being voluntarily constrained drop by
about 7-8%, while those of being under- or unemployed rise by a similar amount.
As should be evident from equations (17)–(18), the joint 6-regime discrete response model we
estimate has the speciﬁc binary/ordered structure we described above. A test of this speciﬁcation,
which readily follows from the theoretical model, is to estimate the model as an unrestricted, i.e.,
25unordered hexa-nomial probit, and test the over-identifying restrictions. Such an estimation is
feasible using the simulated maximum likelihood method we employ in this paper.20
We discussed in Section 3.1 above that the unordered hexa-nomial probit model involves a
staggering increase in the number of parameters to be estimated relative to the ordered bivariate
model. E.g., the slope parameters of the valuation functions amount to 180, since 5¯ vectors are
estimated for each explanatory variable. In order to conduct such a test by means of state-of-the-
art technology we have to restrict ourselves to a subset of the data. We estimated an unrestricted
trinomial probit model for the labor constraint indicator and an unrestricted hexa-nomial probit
model for the full model and compared them with the respective restricted ones. We refrain from
reporting all of our estimation results because of the number of parameters involved. We are happy
to note that key aspects of the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected. In particular, referring
to the discussion on p.18 above, we note that the estimated correlation coeﬃcient between the i.i.d.
terms of the AR(1) components of the errors for the unrestricted trinomial model is nearly ¡1,
exactly as predicted by the ordered model. Similarly, the most highly signiﬁcant of the components
of the parameter vectors of the indicator functions are quite near the theoretical prediction that
they sum up to zero. We take these results as powerful evidence in favor of our theoretical structure.
Finally, we discuss a test of the validity of the assumption made typically that the random
eﬀects are uncorrelated with the independent variables of the model. We noted above that we
have estimated both models by introducing the time means of those of the independent variables
which are time-varying as separate regressors [Chamberlain (1984)] . These are the results that
are reported in Tables 6i and 7i, as we indicate on both tables. Exclusion of the time means is
statistically rejected according to the likelihood ratio test (Â2 values in excess of 220 with 16 degrees
of freedom, rising to over 240 in the more restrictive column (a) versions). The models that we
report lend themselves to a more intuitive interpretation in that the estimated coeﬃcients relate to
the eﬀect of a variable’s deviation from its time average. The fact that exclusion of the time-means
is drastically rejected and that the estimates do not diﬀer very much from those obtained without
the time averages implies that the assumption that the random eﬀects are uncorrelated with the
20The model we derive from our theory is clearly nested in the classical sense in such a standard hexa-nomial probit
model, which makes this testing approach have good asymptotic power properties. The correct distribution theory
required for these tests is complicated by the fact that the null hypothesis involves restrictions on the boundary of
the parameter space.
26regressors in our model is rejected. The model without the time averages would be inconsistent
and hence including the time-means is important in soaking such correlations.
5.5 Comparisons with Past Work with Quantity Constraints
We now discuss how our work compares with the previous literature that utilizes qualitative in-
formation. Zeldes (1989a) makes no use of employment constraints information and restricts his
attention to whether a household is liquidity constrained. Ball (1990) uses data from the PSID
for 1968-1981 and classiﬁes a worker as constrained in a given year if he either experiences a spell
of unemployment or cannot work as many hours as he wants. A respondent is constrained if he
answers “no” to “Was there more work available on your job [or “any of your jobs” if more than one]
so that you could have worked more if you had wanted to?” and “yes” to “Would you have liked
to work more if you could have found more work?” However, a person is considered constrained
in all years if he was classiﬁed as constrained in any year. Thus, the sample split employed by
Ball is time-invariant and results in 9290, or 70%, of his 13,265 annual observations being classi-
ﬁed as constrained. We, on the other hand, exploit the substantial time variation associated with
these qualitative employment status categories. This is one of the reasons for which this paper
may be considered as a generalization of Ball’s. The other is that we allow for the possibility of
overemployment constraints, which he does not.
Biddle (1988) uses PSID data for 1976-1980 and a scheme similar to Ball’s to classify workers
as constrained. Workers are constrained, if they are against either an upper bound on hours of
work, (i.e., if they answer no to the question of whether more work was available and yes to the
question of whether they would like to work more), or if they are against a lower bound, (i.e., if
they answer no to the question of whether they could work less). Biddle works with a full sample
of 1249 observations on ﬁrst-diﬀerences, of which 1044, or 84%, are classiﬁed as constrained.
Ham (1982) explores the qualitative aspects of labor supply in detail while using a single cross-
section of 835 workers from the PSID for 1971. A worker is unconstrained if he/she is neither
underemployed nor unemployed, and distinguishes three categories of constrained workers: un-
employed but not underemployed, underemployed but not unemployed, and underemployed and
unemployed. Ham ignores the possibly constraining eﬀect of overemployment, by arguing that it is
27relatively unimportant. He deﬁnes a worker as underemployed if a worker is constrained in terms of
hours of work per week, that is, if the worker answers no to the question of whether more work was
available and yes to the question of whether he wanted to work more then such a worker is classiﬁed
as underemployed. A worker is classiﬁed as unemployed if the worker is constrained in terms of
weeks per year. It is thus possible for a worker to be both underemployed and unemployed. We do
not draw such a distinction, especially in view of the fact that hours of work are reported on an
annual basis. Ham (1982) uses univariate and bivariate probit models for underemployment and
unemployment as distinct selection rules to correct for sample selection bias aﬀecting labor supply
behavior. He ﬁnds that unemployment and underemployment reﬂect constraints on behavior. He
notes that diﬀerent factors may determine those states, e.g., business cycle variables are important
for unemployment but not for underemployment.
In examining the data, we have also replicated Ham’s criteria and conﬁrmed the consistency of
our selection with his. The diﬀerence of his selection from our labor constraint indicator Et is that
his is not ordered and does not distinguish overemployment (which, however, is not numerically
very important).
Kahn and Lang (1992) argue hours constraints may be motivated by contract theory. They
employ a static ordered probit model of discrete events which are roughly comparable to ours.
Their tests of speciﬁc features of labor-contract theory with data from the 1981 wave of the PSID
largely reject such explanations of hours constraints.
The present paper with its emphasis on possibly time-varying discrete events in panel data
is more closely related to Ham (1986), who uses PSID data for 473 individuals from 1971-1979.
His experiments with dummy variables for underemployment and unemployment, deﬁning them
identically to his earlier work [Ham (1982)] as time-varying right hand side endogenous variables,
is an improvement over Ball’s notion of time-invariant constraints. In view of the endogeneity of
these dummy variables, Ham (1986) instruments them by means of a set of exogenous variables
chosen to proxy the labor market conditions facing a worker. However, those events are inherently
discrete, and Ham’s econometric procedures do not handle them as such.
Hyslop (1999) studies the intertemporal labor force participation behaviour of married women
within a dynamic search framework using panel data. He estimates multiperiod linear probability
28and probit models, allowing for a rich dynamic structure. He ﬁnds very signiﬁcant state dependence,
unobserved heterogeneity, and serial correlation. In line with our ﬁndings here, he reports a crucial
role for lagged state dependence and temporal correlation in the unobservables in such dynamic
discrete models of employment behaviour. In contrast to our study here, he places emphasis on the
linear probability models whereas we focus solely on probit ones. More importantly, his approach
does not allow for the random persistent heterogeneity eﬀects to be correlated with the regressors,
whereas our results are more robust in this dimension.
Ham and Reilly (2002) extend the Lucas–Rapping model of equilibrium labor supply by means of
the implicit contracts model as an equilibrium model and of the hours restrictions as a disequilibrium
model, and and test their models using PSID for 1972–1992, and Current Expenditure Survey data
for 1984–1992. They reject the Lucas–Rapping predictions of intertemporal substitution in labor
supply. Hours restrictions are introduced by means of an endogenous switching model, where
an upper bound on hours worked indicates that unemployment is present when it is binding.
The resulting model is a two-sided Tobit, whose discrete part is similar to our ordered probit
model. While their model is clearly more closely grounded in economic theory than ours, the
dynamics in the stochastic structure of our model are much richer than theirs, which are restricted
to time dummies only and appeal to instruments to account for dynamic elements in the stochastic
structure. This poses questions about the power of their tests when the stochastic structure is so
simple in an explicitly dynamic economic model.
6 Conclusion
We explore in this paper empirical implications of a theory of labor supply and consumption deci-
sions that goes further than previous research in allowing for a role of such institutional constraints
as limited access to borrowing and involuntary unemployment and overemployment. We report
estimations for discrete dependent variables with two simultaneous dynamic probit models. The
ﬁrst describes a household’s propensity to be constrained in borrowing, while the second, a dynamic
ordered probit model for a labor constraint indicator, describes qualitative aspects of the condi-
tions of employment, that is whether the household head is involuntarily overemployed, voluntarily
employed, or involuntarily underemployed or unemployed. These models are estimated, separately
29and jointly, as well as in ordered and in unordered quasi-structural form versions. We believe that
the dynamic labor constraint model has not been considered before in the literature nor has a panel
model with as general a structure for the unobservables. The quasi-structural forms we estimated
capture state dependence and spillovers among the underlying decisions, while the panel structure
of the unobservables allows for correlation between the time-invariant components of the random
eﬀects in the two equations and for an autoregressive component. Our diagnostics suggest that our
estimation models exhibit remarkably good ﬁts.
In terms of its structure and empirical objectives, the paper may be considered as an in-
tegration of two separate strands of the empirical literature, both with respect to the equilib-
rium/disequilibrium dichotomy on one hand (Ashenfelter (1980) and Ham (1986)), and with respect
to the interaction between labor supply and consumption decisions on the other (Altonji (1986),
Ball (1990), and Zeldes (1989a)).
Individuals may face restrictions on the amount of work they can supply to their employers
as well as restrictions on borrowing against their future incomes. Though they may resent such
restrictions, they still adapt their lifetime plans to them and in the light of the best information they
have about the presence of such constraints in the future. The assumption that is made sometimes,
namely that all ﬂuctuations in employment status and hours worked over time is voluntary, is an
undue restriction that may therefore lead to inconsistent estimation and misinterpretation of the
data. These problems can be overcome when information is utilized, as in this paper, about the
voluntary/involuntary nature of changes in employment over time.
From among the numerous unexplored areas of research that our approach has opened up, we
note the possibility of estimating and testing the extent of the dependence of the structural form for
each of the endogenous variables conditionally on the regime characterizing the other. In view of the
diﬃculty of estimating life cycle consistent dynamic models, we note that the simulation methods
that we employ here may be combined fruitfully in the future with non parametric methods [Magnac
and Thesmar (2002)]. These issues deserve attention in future research.
30Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Number of Household Spells: 2410
Variable Nobs Mean StdDev Med Mode Min Max InterQuart
county unempl. rate 32870 6.5878 2.8626 6 5 1 34 3
hd disabled? 35860 0.1271 0.3331 0 0 0 1 0
out of lab. force? 36963 0.1232 0.3287 0 0 0 1 0
overemployed? 36963 0.0484 0.2146 0 0 0 1 0
underemployed? 36963 0.1723 0.3776 0 0 0 1 0
unemployed? 36963 0.0218 0.146 0 0 0 1 0
vol. employed? 36963 0.6341 0.4816 1 1 0 1 1
education hd 34631 4.9438 1.8144 5 4 0 8 2
food needs 36963 1054.895 417.5646 1016 669 337 9999 555
family size 35917 3.1169 1.4472 3 2 1 14 2
growth food needs 35913 -0.0134 0.2296 0 0 -2.7044 2.7044 0.0249
hd age 34828 41.5437 15.0652 38 29 17 92 23
tenure hd (months) 32654 82.1139 96.3621 39 0 0 960 156
live in north-centr? 36961 0.3159 0.4649 0 0 0 1 1
live in north-east? 36961 0.1985 0.3989 0 0 0 1 0
live in south? 36961 0.3055 0.4606 0 0 0 1 1
hd married? 34828 0.8773 0.3279 1 1 0 1 0
num.child. 0-17 yrs 34828 1.0314 1.2217 1 0 0 8 2
num.child. 0-5 yrs 27951 0.3731 0.6815 0 0 0 4 1
occup. unempl. rate 28737 5.8824 3.6405 4.6999 3 1.4 17.0999 4.8000
race of hd: black? 36954 0.0523 0.2226 0 0 0 1 0
race of hd: white? 36954 0.8972 0.3036 1 1 0 1 0
real disposable inc 35793 10588.7 8535.672 9535.164 0 -223144 530110.5 6680.785
hd cath./eastorthdx? 32846 0.1354 0.3422 0 0 0 1 0
hd no religion/DK? 36963 0.4800 0.4996 0 0 0 1 1
hd ‘protestant’? 32846 0.4234 0.4941 0 0 0 1 1
real int rate aft.tx 33088 0.0242 0.0241 0.0231 0.0024 -0.0357 0.0946 0.0368
real total asset inc 34767 861.1424 4227.124 7.0049 0 -4085.33 466999.5 404.4456
spouse age 34820 34.6510 18.5908 33 0 0 87 23
unempld in (t-1)? 35917 0.1146 0.3186 0 0 0 1 0
liquidity constrained?
¤ 34563 0.2724 0.4452 1 1 0 1 1
¤ zdumc2 = 1 if total asset income relative to average income over last to periods is less the 1=6. See subsection 8.1
for details.
31Table 2: One-Period Transitions in Liquidity Indicator St – Male Heads
St = 1 St = 0
liq. constrained not liq. constrained Row Per Cent
S(t ¡ 1) = 1 8.7 21.1 29.8
liq. constrained
S(t ¡ 1) = 0 16.9 53.3 70.2
not liq. constrained
Column Per Cent 25.6 74.4 100.00
Table 3: Dynamic Transition Counts — Male Heads
Number of ∆St ∆Et
Transitions Frequency Cumulative Frequency Cumulative
4 cells 5 cells 4 cells 5 cells
0 15.4 15.4 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.0
1 9.7 25.1 5.0 4.6 7.2 6.7
2 9.4 34.5 6.5 6.2 13.6 12.9
3 8.2 42.7 7.2 7.1 20.9 20.0
4 9.3 52.0 8.3 8.1 29.1 28.1
5 7.9 59.1 8.7 8.8 37.9 37.0
6 7.1 67.0 7.5 7.2 45.4 44.1
7 6.9 74.0 7.4 7.7 52.8 51.8
8 5.1 79.1 7.2 7.4 60.1 59.1
9 4.1 83.2 6.2 6.0 66.3 65.1
10 3.3 86.5 5.4 5.6 71.7 70.7
11 3.2 89.6 4.8 4.8 76.5 75.6
12-19 10.3 100.0 23.5 24.4 100.0 100.0
Table 4: One-Period Transitions in Employment Indicator Et – Male Heads
-1 0 1 99
over/ed under/- or un/ed out-of-the-labor-force Row Per Cent
-1 0.23 3.08 0.81 0.66 4.78
overemployed
0 3.01 38.06 10.60 7.30 58.96
1 0.87 11.03 4.36 2.21 18.48
under/unemployed
99 0.84 11.00 3.42 2.53 17.78
out-of-the-labor-force
Column Per Cent 4.94 63.16 19.19 12.71 100.00
Table 5: Cross-Tabulation of St vs. Et – Male Heads
Et = ¡1 Et = 0 Et = 1 Et = 99 Row Per Cent
over/ed under/- or un/ed out-of-the-labor-force
St = 1 1.15 15.17 8.69 2.22 27.24
not liq. constrained
St = 0 3.73 47.34 11.15 10.54 72.76
liq. constrained
Column Per Cent 4.88 62.51 19.85 12.76 100.00
32Table 6i: Liquidity Constraint Equation: Parameter Estimates
Male Heads, In-the-Labor-Force, Dependent Variable: zdumc2 (S)
Liquidity Constraint Equation Version 6(a) Version 6(b) Version 6(c)
Jointly With Empl. Eq.: Version 7(a) Version 7(b) Version 7(b)
¤
LogLikelihood -29428.97 -29422.74 -29401.40
16 ¯ Xi¢ LR: 192.16 189.77 181.69





it ) 0.43 18.2 0.38 15.3 0.34 7.89
¾
bp
´i 0.85 31.2 0.85 31.2 0.85 31.1
½
bp
AR 0.68 11.8 0.68 14.3 0.68 13.8
Regressor Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
intercept 94.4 2.55 95.7 2.59 94.5 2.55
liq.cons. binding at t-1? 1.12 38.9 1.12 38.8 1.12 38.9
liq.cons. binding at t-2? 0.15 5.04 0.15 4.95 0.15 4.98
overemployed? -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.006 0.11
overemployed at t-1? -.- -.- 0.01 0.27 0.02 0.35
overemployed at t-2? -.- -.- -0.04 -0.67 -0.03 -0.65
unemployed? -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.12 3.85
unemployed at t-1? -.- -.- 0.03 1.04 0.02 0.56
unemployed at t-2? -.- -.- 0.04 1.34 0.04 1.20
county unmpl rate -0.0003 -0.06 -0.0006 -0.10 -0.001 -0.21
head disabled? -0.04 -0.78 -0.04 -0.79 -0.05 -0.86
education head -0.06 -5.03 -0.06 -4.83 -0.06 -4.61
year=1976–1979 0.89 2.78 0.89 2.76 0.88 2.73
year=1980-1983 0.86 3.02 0.86 3.02 0.85 3.00
year=1984-1987 0.59 2.61 0.58 2.58 0.58 2.57
food needs -0.0002 -3.70 -0.0002 -3.72 -0.0002 -3.76
growth food needs -0.25 -5.47 -0.25 -5.51 -0.25 -5.51
head age -0.41 -10.26 -0.41 -10.23 -0.40 -10.06
head age cubed -0.00005 -6.73 -0.00005 -6.71 -0.00005 -6.57
head age squared 0.008 7.80 0.008 7.78 0.008 7.63
tenure head (months) -0.001 -2.77 -0.001 -2.69 -0.001 -2.47
tenure head squared 1.06e-06 0.88 1.04e-06 0.86 8.9e-07 0.73
unempl. insur. head 9.16e-06 0.45 6.66e-06 0.33 -2.02e-06 -0.10
labr market state 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.66
live in north-centr? -0.12 -1.97 -0.12 -1.94 -0.12 -1.93
live in other regions? 0.43 2.80 0.43 2.79 0.43 2.73
live in south? 0.12 1.97 0.12 1.99 0.12 2.00
live in west? 0.08 1.18 0.08 1.22 0.09 1.26
head single? 0.70 14.02 0.70 13.97 0.69 13.92
num chldrn age 0-5 -0.05 -2.35 -0.05 -2.39 -0.05 -2.37
occupational unempl 0.02 3.36 0.02 3.26 0.02 3.16
head black? 0.61 6.27 0.60 6.22 0.59 6.19
head other race? 0.18 1.60 0.17 1.55 0.17 1.50
head relig chr./eorth? 0.09 1.58 0.09 1.61 0.09 1.57
head relig jewish? 0.16 1.45 0.17 1.45 0.16 1.42
head relig protestant? 0.16 3.75 0.16 3.76 0.16 3.77
real interest rate 14.25 7.64 14.1 7.57 13.6 7.31
head union member? -0.03 -0.73 -0.03 -0.77 -0.03 -0.86
plus 16 time-averages see text, p.16 see text, p.16 see text, p.16
¤ Joint estimation with Employment Version 7(c) would have violated the Coherency condition discussed above.
33Table 6ii: Liquidity Constraint Equation: Estimated Marginal Eﬀects
Male Heads, In-the-Labor-Force, Dependent Variable: zdumc2 (S)
Liquidity Constraint Eq. Version 6(a) Version 6(b) Version 6(c)
Jointly With Empl. Eq.: Version 7(a) Version 7(b) Version 7(b)
¤
b Plc( ¯ X) 0.18 0.18 0.18
b Plc 0.27 0.27 0.27
1(Xit ˆ ¯ > 0) 0.26 0.26 0.26
Correct Predictions 0.88 0.88 0.88
Regressor ¯ X ∆
¤ b Plc ∆
¤¤ b Plc ∆
¤ b Plc ∆
¤¤ b Plc ∆
¤ b Plc ∆
¤¤ b Plc
liq.cons. at t-1? ** 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
liq.cons. at t-2? ** 0.27 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032
overemployed? ** 0.055 -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.001 0.001
overemployed at t-1? ** 0.06 -.- -.- 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
overemployed at t-2? ** 0.06 -.- -.- -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007
unemployed? ** 0.22 -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.03 0.03
unemployed at t-1? ** 0.22 -.- -.- 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.004
unemployed at t-2? ** 0.22 -.- -.- 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
county unmpl rate 6.51 -7.2e-5 -0.02 -0.0001 -0.02 -0.0003 -0.02
head disabled? ** 0.08 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 0.009 -0.009 -0.009
education head 4.80 -0.01 0.12 -0.013 0.12 -0.01 0.12
year=1976–1979 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
year=1980-1983 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
year=1984-1987 0.25 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
food needs 1094 -3.9e-5 -4.32e-5 -3.95e-5 0.0001 -4.01e-5 -8.8e-5
growth food needs -0.01 -0.05 -0.43 -0.05 -0.44 -0.05 -0.45
head age 39.07 -0.09 -2.47 -0.08 -2.47 -0.08 -2.46
head age cubed 78546 -1.12e-5 0.0007 -1.11e-5 0.0007 -1.09e-5 0.0007
head age squared 1679.4 0.002 0.08 0.002 0.08 0.002 0.08
tenure head (months) 93.1 -0.0002 0.01 -0.0002 0.01 -0.0002 0.01
tenure head squared 18142 2.2e-7 1.55e-5 2.2e-7 1.48e-5 1.86e-7 1.46e-5
unempl. insur. head 108.4 1.92e-6 1.01e-5 1.39e-6 1.53e-5 -4.23e-7 -1.42e-5
labr market state 3.83 0.002 0.05 0.002 0.05 0.002 0.05
live in north-centr? ** 0.32 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
live in other regions? ** 0.007 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
live in south? ** 0.30 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
live in west? ** 0.17 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
head single? ** 0.11 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
num chldrn age 0-5 0.37 -0.01 2.89 -0.01 2.83 -0.01 2.82
occupational unempl 5.89 0.004 0.02 0.004 0.02 0.003 0.02
head black? ** 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
head other race? ** 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
head relig chr./eorth? ** 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
head relig jewish? ** 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
head relig protestant? ** 0.44 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
real interest rate 0.02 2.98 0.22 2.95 0.22 2.86 0.23
head union member? ** 0.21 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007
plus 16 time-averages see text, p.16 see text, p.16 see text, p.16
¤ Joint estimation with Employment Version 7(c) would have violated the Coherency condition.
**: denotes a dummy variable regressor.
Marginal eﬀects: ∆
¤ ˆ Plc ´
(
@ ˆ Plc
@Xj for a continuous regressor Xj,
ˆ Plc(Xj = 1) ¡ ˆ Plc(Xj = 0) for a dummy variable regressor Xj.
∆





@ ¯ Xj for a continuous regressor Xj paired with its time-mean,
ˆ Plc(Xj = 1; ¯ Xj = time-mean) ¡ ˆ Plc(Xj = 0; ¯ Xj = 0) for a dummy variable regressor Xj paired with its time-mean.
34Table 7i: Employment Constraints Equation: Parameter Estimates
Male Heads, In-the-Labor-Force, Dependent Variable: LabCon3 (E)
Employment Constraints Equation Version 7(a) Version 7(b) Version 7(c)
Estimated Jointly With Liquid. Eq.: Version 6(a) Version 6(b) Version 6(b)
¤
LogLikelihood -29428.97 -29422.74 -29406.32
16 ¯ Xi¢ LR 241.72 236.85 222.69





it ) 0.43 18.26 0.38 15.3 0.34 7.89
¾
op
´i 0.52 22.4 0.52 21.8 0.49 20.4
½
op
AR 0.45 7.47 0.43 8.23 0.40 7.40
µ
¡ -2.72 -4.25 -2.72 -4.26 -2.72 -4.26
µ
+ normalized at 0 normalized at 0 normalized at 0
Regressor Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
intercept 33.7 24.3 31.6 24.3 31.9 24.3
overemployed at t-1? -0.68 -21.3 -0.68 -21.3 -0.68 -21.3
overemployed at t-2? -0.32 -10.1 -0.32 -10.1 -0.32 -10.1
unemployed at t-1? 0.70 36.3 0.69 36.1 0.69 36.1
unemployed at t-2? 0.37 19.3 0.36 19.1 0.36 19.1
liq.const. binds -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.12 5.07
liq.cons. at t-1 -.- -.- 0.05 1.99 -0.01 -0.49
liq.cons. at t-2 -.- -.- 0.01 0.51 -0.002 -0.10
county unmpl rate 0.007 2.11 0.007 2.13 0.007 2.15
head disabled? 0.04 1.62 0.04 1.59 0.04 1.61
education head -0.03 -5.78 -0.03 -5.62 -0.03 -5.52
year=1976–1979 0.11 0.54 0.12 0.57 0.10 0.49
year=1980-1983 0.26 1.41 0.26 1.44 0.25 1.34
year=1984-1987 0.19 1.31 0.20 1.34 0.18 1.23
food needs 0.0001 4.40 0.0001 4.44 0.00001 4.39
growth food needs -0.09 -2.68 -0.10 -3.00 -0.08 -2.54
head age -0.09 -5.16 -0.08 -4.90 -0.07 -4.37
head age cubed -0.00001 -4.19 -0.00001 -4.05 -0.00001 -3.67
head age squared 0.002 4.47 0.002 4.29 0.002 3.85
tenure head (months) -0.002 -8.19 -0.002 -8.07 -0.002 -7.96
tenure head squared 3.2e-06 5.29 3.2e-06 5.22 3.2e-06 5.16
unempl. insur. head 0.0003 16.63 0.0003 16.63 0.0003 16.62
imputed wage 0.002 2.45 0.002 2.52 0.003 2.63
labr market state 0.02 1.93 0.02 1.90 0.02 1.88
in north-centr? -0.05 -2.32 -0.05 -2.25 -0.05 -2.16
in other regions? 0.05 0.60 0.05 0.54 0.04 0.46
in south? -0.02 -0.92 -0.02 -0.95 -0.02 -0.98
in west? -0.15 -6.08 -0.15 -6.08 -0.15 -6.08
head single? 0.05 1.92 0.04 1.51 0.03 0.96
num chldrn age 0-5 0.01 0.99 0.01 1.00 0.01 1.03
occupational unempl 0.01 5.06 0.01 4.96 0.01 4.88
head black? 0.15 4.34 0.14 4.04 0.13 3.79
head other race? 0.25 5.24 0.25 5.24 0.25 5.20
head relig chr./eorth? 0.03 1.19 0.03 1.24 0.03 1.20
head relig jewish? 0.05 1.06 0.05 1.05 0.05 0.98
head relig protestant? -0.01 -0.57 -0.01 -0.54 -0.01 -0.63
real interest rate 13.2 12.83 12.9 12.54 12.6 12.22
head union member? 0.08 4.35 0.08 4.43 0.08 4.45
plus 16 time-averages see text, p.16 see text, p.16 see text, p.16
¤ Joint estimation with Liquidity Constraint Version 6(c) would have violated the Coherency condition.
35Table 7ii: Employment Constraints Equation: Estimated Marginal Eﬀects
Male Heads, In-the-Labor-Force, Dependent Variable: LabCon3 (E)
Employment Constraints Eq. Version 7(a) Version 7(b) Version 7(c)
Jointly With Liquid. Eq.: Version 6(a) Version 6(b) Version 6(b)
¤
b P¢( ¯ X) overE:0.03 unE:0.19 overE:0.03 unE:0.19 overE:0.03 unE:0.19
b P¢ overE:0.06 unE:0.22 overE:0.06 unE:0.22 overE:0.06 unE:0.22
Correct Predictions overE:0.94 unE:0.81 overE:0.94 unE:0.81 overE:0.94 unE:0.81
Regressor ¯ X ∆
¤ b Pvol ∆
¤¤ b Pvol ∆
¤ b Pvol ∆
¤¤ b Pvol ∆
¤ b Pvol ∆
¤¤ b Pvol
head overemployed in t-1?** .06 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05
head overemployed in t-2?** .06 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
head unemployed in t-1?** .22 -.18 -.18 -.18 -.18 -.18 -.18
head unemployed in t-2?** .22 -.08 -.08 -.08 -.08 -.08 -.08
liquidity constraint binds?** .27 -.- -.- -.- -.- -.02 -.02
liquidity constraint binds at t-1?** .27 -.- -.- -.009 -.009 .002 .002
liquidity constraint binds at t-2?** .27 -.- -.- -.002 -.002 .0004 .0004
county unemployment rate 6.51 -.001 -0.005 -.001 -0.005 -.001 -0.005
head disabled?** .08 -.009 0.08 -.008 0.09 -.008 0.08
education of head 4.80 .006 -0.09 .006 -0.09 .006 -0.09
year=1976–1979 .21 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02
year=1980-1983 .24 -.06 -.06 -.06 -.06 -.05 -.05
year=1984-1987 .25 -.04 -.04 -.04 -.04 -.04 -.04
household food needs 1094. -.00002 0.0002 -.00002 0.0002 -.00002 0.0002
growth of household food needs -.01 .02 0.58 .02 0.61 .02 0.59
head age 39.1 .02 0.58 .02 0.58 .01 0.54
head age cubed 78546. 2.4e-06 9.9e-05 2.3e-06 0.0001 2.1e-06 9.1e-05
head age squared 1679. -.0003 -0.01 -.0003 -0.01 -.0003 -0.01
tenure of head (months) 93.1 .0003 0.0009 .0003 0.0008 .0003 0.001
tenure of head squared 18142. -6.2e-07 -3.7e-06 -6.1e-07 -3.55e-06 -6.18e-07 -4.0e-06
unemployment insurance of head 108.4 -.00005 -0.0002 -.00005 -0.0002 -.00005 -0.0002
imputed wage of head 8.49 -.0005 -0.001 -.0005 -0.001 -.0005 -0.001
labour market state 3.83 -.003 0.004 -.003 0.002 -.003 0.003
live in north-centr?** .32 .01 .009 .01 .009 .009 .009
live in other regions?** .007 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.009 -.008 -.008
live in south?** .30 .004 .004 .004 .004 .004 .004
live in west?** .17 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03
head single?** .11 -.01 -.01 -.008 -.008 -.005 -.005
number of chlidren aged 0-5 .37 - -.002 0.24 -.002 0.22 -.003 0.25
occupational unemployment 5.89 -.003 -0.004 -.003 -0.004 -.003 -0.004
head black?** .05 - -.03 -.03 -.03 -.03 -.03 -.03
head other race?** .05 - -.06 -.06 -.06 -.06 -.06 -.06
head religion chr./eorth?** .14 -.007 -.007 -.007 -.007 -.007 -.007
head religion jewish?** .03 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01
head religion protestant?** .44 .002 .002 .002 .002 .003 .003
real interest rate (after tax) .02 -2.53 0.14 -2.48 0.13 -2.42 0.13
head union member?** .21 -.02 -0.29 -.02 -0.30 -.02 -0.29
plus 16 time-averages see text, p.16 see text, p.16 see text, p.16
¤ Joint estimation with Liquidity Constraint Version 6(c) would have violated the Coherency condition.
**: denotes a dummy variable regressor.
Marginal eﬀects (all evaluated at ¯ X):
∆
¤ ˆ Pvol ´
(
@ ˆ P(E=0)
@Xj for a continuous regressor Xj,
ˆ P(E = 0)(Xj = 1) ¡ ˆ P(E = 0)(Xj = 0) for a dummy variable regressor Xj.
∆





@ ¯ Xj for a continuous Xj paired with its time-mean,
ˆ P(E = 0)(Xj = 1; ¯ Xj = timavg) ¡ ˆ P(E = 0)(Xj = 0; ¯ Xj = 0) for a dummy variable Xj paired with its time-mean.
Analogously for [oe ´ (E = ¡1)] and [ue ´ (E = 1)].
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397 Appendix A: Econometric Methodology
7.1 The Method of Maximum Smoothly Simulated Likelihood (MSSL)
In this paper we employ the method of maximum smoothly simulated likelihood (MSSL) in conjunc-
tion with the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator in order to overcome the well-known
computation intractabilities of the multiperiod (panel) limited-dependent-variable models presented
in section 4. The MSSL approach was developed in B¨ orsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993), while
its theoretical properties were derived rigorously in Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1998).
7.2 The GHK Simulator
The leading simulator for multivariate normal rectangle probabilities of the form encountered in ML
estimation of LDV models under Gaussian distributional assumptions is the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-
Keane approach. See Hajivassiliou et al. (1996) for extensive Monte-Carlo evidence that this
simulator is to be preferred over all other known simulators for this problem. To outline this
method, deﬁne q(u;a;b) ´ Φ¡1(Φ(a) ¢ (1 ¡ u) + Φ(b) ¢ u), where 0 < u < 1 and ¡1 · a < b · 1.
Then q is a mapping that takes a uniform (0;1) random variate into a truncated standard normal
random variate on the interval [a;b].
Proposition 1 Consider the multivariate normal M £ 1 random vector Y » N(X¯;Ω) with
Ω positive deﬁnite, the linear transformation Z = FY » N(FX¯;Σ), with F non-singular and
Σ = FΩF0, and the event B ´ fa¤ · Z = FY · b¤g, with ¡1 · a¤ < b¤ · +1. Deﬁne
P ´
R
B n(z;FX¯;Σ)dz, a ´ a¤ ¡ FX¯, b ´ b¤ ¡ FX¯, and let L denote the lower-triangular
Cholesky factor of Σ. Let (u1;¢¢¢;uM) be a vector of independent uniform (0;1) random variates.
Deﬁne recursively for j = 1;¢¢¢;M:
ej = q (uj;(aj ¡ Lj1e1 ¡ ¢¢¢ ¡ Lj;j¡1ej¡1)=Ljj;(bj ¡ Lj1e1 ¡ ¢¢¢ ¡ Lj;j¡1ej¡1)=Ljj); (22)
Qj ´ Φ((bj ¡ Lj1e1 ¡ ¢¢¢ ¡ Lj;j¡1ej¡1)=Ljj) ¡ Φ((ai ¡ Lj1e1 ¡ ¢¢¢ ¡ Lj;j¡1ej¡1)=Ljj): (23)
Deﬁne e ´ (e1;¢¢¢;eM)0, ˜ Y ´ X¯ + F¡1Le, and Q(e) ´ Q1 ¢ ¢¢¢ ¢ QM. Then ˜ Y is a random vector
on B, and the ratio of the densities of ˜ Y and Y at y = X¯+F¡1Le, where e is any vector satisfying
a · Le · b, is P=Q(e).
Proof: B¨ orsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993) and Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1997).
These studies also explain that combining Proposition 1 about the GHK simulator together with
importance-sampling arguments, one can show that GHK is a smooth, unbiased, and consistent
simulator for the likelihood contributions Pi and their derivatives Pµi, and a smooth, asymptotically
unbiased, and consistent simulator for the logarithmic derivatives of the P(¢) expressions.
A complete implementation of the GHK simulator requires a computational procedure that
returns the simulated probability, ˜ P, as a function of the following arguments:




c=Cholesky factor of w;
vectors a and b, deﬁning the restriction region a < Z < b;
r=number of replications;
u=a m £ r matrix of i.i.d. uniform [0,1] variates.
Such computational procedures in GAUSS, FORTRAN, and C versions are publicly available
40through the World-Wide-Web at the URL:
http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/vassilis/pub/simulation.
7.3 Simultaneous Determination of the Liquidity and Employment Constraint
Indicators
For a typical household spell i (assumed to be independently distributed from other household
spells) and dropping the i index for simplicity, the MSSL method allows us to take fully into
account the simultaneity in the determination of the liquidity (St) and the employment constraint




t that are the













0 if µ¡ · E¤
t < µ+
1 if µ+ · E¤
t .
Also dropping the t subscript for ease of notation, we consider the model with spillover eﬀects on
both sides, i.e., the one exhibiting full simultaneity:
y¤
1 ´ S¤ = 1(y¤
2 < µ¡)±01 + 1(y¤
2 > µ+)±02 + x1¯1 + ²1
y¤
2 ´ E¤ = 1(y¤
1 > 0)·0 + x2¯2 + ²2
Note that we have decomposed the contemporaneous spillover eﬀect ±0E on the RHS of S¤ into
±011(E = ¡1) + ±021(E = 1), i.e., into separate terms for the overemployment and the un-
der/unemployment indicators.
Since (S;E) lie in f0;1g£f¡1;0;1g, the 6 possible conﬁgurations may be enumerated as follows:
S E y¤
1 ´ S¤ y¤
2 ´ E¤
0 -1 ±01 + x1¯1 + ²1 < 0, x2¯2 + ²2 < µ¡
0 0 x1¯1 + ²1 < 0, µ¡ < x2¯2 + ²2 < µ+
0 1 ±02 + x1¯1 + ²1 < 0, µ+ < x2¯2 + ²2
1 -1 ±01 + x1¯1 + ²1 > 0, ·0 + x2¯2 + ²2 < µ¡
1 0 x1¯1 + ²1 > 0, µ¡ < ·0 + x2¯2 + ²2 < µ+
1 1 ±02 + x1¯1 + ²1 > 0, µ+ < ·0 + x2¯2 + ²2
In terms of the GHK simulator described in subsection 7.2 above, the probability of a pair















where (²1;²2)0 » N((¹1;¹2)0;Σ²), and a and b are given by:
S E a1 a2 b1 b2
0 -1 ¡1 ¡1 ¡(±01 + x1¯1) µ¡ ¡ x2¯2
0 0 ¡1 µ¡ ¡ x2¯2 ¡x1¯1 µ+ ¡ x2¯2
0 1 ¡1 µ+ ¡ x2¯2 ¡(±02 + x1¯1) +1
1 -1 ¡(±01 + x1¯1) ¡1 +1 µ¡ ¡ ·0 ¡ x2¯2
1 0 ¡x1¯1 µ¡ ¡ ·0 ¡ x2¯2 +1 µ+ ¡ ·0 ¡ x2¯2
1 1 ¡(±02 + x1¯1) µ+ ¡ ·0 ¡ x2¯2 +1 +1
41The variance-covariance matrix captures the contemporaneous correlation between ²1 and ²2.
Given the binary probit nature of S and the ordered probit nature of E, ¾²1 and ¾²2 need to be
normalized. Subsection 7.5 below explains how our estimations take full account of the contempo-
raneous correlation in the ²s as well as their ﬂexible forms of serial correlation.
7.4 Coherency Conditions
To maintain the logical consistency of the model (known in the literature as “statistical coherency”),
S¤
t should not depend on E¤
t , if E¤
t depends on S¤
t and vice-versa. Formally, the coherency conditions
in terms of the above notation are:
(±01 + ±02)·0 = 0 and ±01±02·0 = 0:
In other words, either ·0 = 0; in which case ±01;±02 are free to diﬀer from 0, or ·0 6= 0 in which
case both ±01 and ±02 must be zero.
To verify this requirement, suppose (S;E) = (0;0). This rules out (S;E) = (0;¡1) because
x2¯2 + ²2 > µ¡, and rules out (S;E) = (1;0) because x1¯1 + ²1 < 0. But (1;¡1) is not ruled out
if the coherency conditions do not hold, since ±01 could be suﬃciently negative and ·0 suﬃciently
positive to imply the (1;¡1) conditions. Similarly, the (1;1) possibility cannot be ruled out in
the absence of the coherency conditions, since ±02 and ·0 can be suﬃciently positive. Such logical
inconsistencies are clearly ruled out if either (a) ·0 = 0 or (b) ±01 and ±02 are simultaneously 0.
In our econometric implementation above, the regression reported in table 6i, column (c),
imposes the “±2 = 0; ±01;±02 free” version of the coherency condition, while table 7i, column (c),
imposes the “·0 free, ±01 = ±02 = 0” version of the coherency conditions. For novel ways of
approaching “coherency” conditions in LDV models with simultaneity, see Hajivassiliou (2003).
7.5 Treatment of Flexible Serial and Contemporaneous Correlations
We have described in subsection 7.3 how the probability of a pair (Sit;Eit) can be represented in















Deﬁne the 2 £ 1 vectors ait, bit, and ²it. Stacking all the Ti periods of observation for individual i
gives the 2 ¢ Ti £ 1 vectors ai, bi, and ²i, where ²i has the 2 ¢ Ti £ 2 ¢ Ti var-covariance matrix with
structure characterized by the precise serial correlation assumptions made on the ²its. In particular,
one-factor random eﬀect assumptions will imply an equicorrelated block structure on Σ², while our
most general assumption of one-factor random eﬀects combined with an AR(1) process for each
error implies that Σ² combines equicorrelated and Toeplitz-matrix features.
Through this representation, the probability of a complete sequence of the observable (S;E)
behaviour for individual household i, conditionally on the initial conditions Si0 and Ei0, is given
by:
P(S1;¢¢¢;STi;E1;¢¢¢;ETi) = Prob(ai < ²i < bi)
Consequently, our approach incorporates fully: (a) the contemporaneous correlations in ²it; (b)
the one-factor plus AR(1) serial correlations in ²i; and (c) the dependency of Sit on Eit; and vice
versa. The possible endogeneity of Si0 and Ei0 is handled by the approximation of allowing them to
depend on all exogenous information available to the econometrician, following Heckman (1981(b)).
We argue that these approximations should be adequate in our case in view of the relatively large
number of time-periods available for each individual household.
428 Appendix B: Data
Our panel data come from the ﬁrst twenty waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, corre-
sponding to years 1968-1987. In processing the data, we followed Zeldes (1989a) and Ball (1990) as
closely as possible and applied selection criteria similar to theirs.21 Zeldes and Ball stopped with
Wave 14, which includes data from the 1981 wave of interviews and was the latest wave available
at the time their research was completed. We include data up to Wave 20, which reports on the
1987 wave of interviews. It should be remembered that the data are based on interviews conducted
in the early Spring, but pertain to households’ circumstances during the preceding calendar year,
unless otherwise indicated. We too excluded from our extract the non-random subsample of the
PSID, known as the Oﬃce of Economic Opportunity sample. Wherever variables are constructed,
such as the end-of-period stock of ﬁnancial assets which we detail below, we followed exactly the
calculations performed by Zeldes and Ball.
Our data are organized according to the following principle. From all panel members interviewed
in 1987 we selected those who were heads of households at the time of the interview, or had been
household heads at least once prior to 1987. We then follow them back up until 1970 and select
“household spells” deﬁned to be sequences of at least four consecutive years during which the same
individuals remained household heads. This design is in accordance with Zeldes’ deﬁnition, even
though his model did not require that he keep track of the panel structure of the data on households,
after ﬁrst diﬀerencing the relevant variables. This is an important diﬀerence between our data and
the data as used by Zeldes and Ball. Our need for the full panel structure of the data causes us
to end up with a smaller data set because of missing values. It is also a reason why their data
(and, in particular, Zeldes’ data, to which he kindly gave us access) do not suﬃce for the full set
of econometric experiments we are interested in.
The restriction that a household spell be at least four years long was dictated by our desire
to study higher than ﬁrst-order dynamics in our switching regressions models. Finally, because of
unavailability of crucial data, we go back only as far as 1970, thus deleting two years of panel data.
We end up with 2410 household spells (thus deﬁned) with male heads, and with a mean length of
household spell being equal to 13.45 years. The distribution of spell lengths is fairly uniform, with
about one-ﬁfth of the sample comprised of spells of length equal to 20. The frequency distribution
of available time-periods per household spell is as follows:
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
30 130 131 93 132 121 116 103 121 138 124 124 118 125 127 103 528
8.1 Construction of the Liquidity Constraint Indicator




1 if total calculated asset holdings
real disposable annual income averaged over last 2 years < 1
6
0 otherwise.
The logic of this construction is that a household is categorized as liquidity constrained if its asset
holdings would be insuﬃcient to replace their current levels of disposable income if the latter were
to be lost two months in succession.
Because the PSID contains data on housing wealth, but not on non-housing net worth, we follow
bold assumptions made by several others [Zeldes (1989a); Ball (1990)] to circumvent the lack of
direct data on assets. Speciﬁcally, we calculated nonhousing wealth using the ﬂow of asset income
21We beneﬁtted from their kind advice, too.
43and an assumed rate of return on wealth, assuming that the ﬁrst $250 of interest and dividend
income is held in savings accounts at commercial banks earning the passbook rate, and that all
additional such income is saved in 3-month Treasury bills or equivalent. We then used these rates
to “scale up” interest and dividend asset income to provide an approximation for the amount of
assets held in savings accounts.22 Real non-housing assets were obtained by deﬂating the nominal
amount by the personal consumption expenditure deﬂator. Finally, we calculated housing equity
as the diﬀerence between house value minus outstanding mortgage principal, both reported in the
PSID. More details may be found in Zeldes (1989a), p.341.
It should be noted that Zeldes proposes three additional classiﬁcation schemes or “splits” — see
ibid., pp.338-344, for details. Our justiﬁcation for focussing on the particular scheme deﬁned above
is two-fold: ﬁrst, Zeldes’ other three schemes require the use of information that is only available in
waves 1–5, 8, and 13 of the PSID. Consequently, such classiﬁcations would have hindered critically
our ability to study the dynamics of intertemporal behaviour using the full panel structure of our
data. Second, we carried out extensive experimentation with the data, which suggested that even
though the proportions of constrained and unconstrained households as measured by the various
indicators may diﬀer, the pattern of switching in and out of being constrained is quite similar. In
addition, we have obtained similar results for the dynamic probit model for liquidity constraints
even with Zeldes’ most stringent classiﬁcation scheme.
8.2 Construction of Labor Constraint Indicators
In view of our data, the endogenous variable Eit is inherently ordinal. The actual numbers used
to code the employment indicator E are not, of course, of any consequence. Further details on the
actual questions asked of survey respondents are presented further below in this Appendix in the
form of ﬂow charts. In recoding the data here we went further than all other previous researchers.
The classiﬁcations are:
Eit = ¡1 : overemployment. (6%)
This is the case if, in year t ¡ 1, individual i was an employed member of the labor force who
answered yes to the question (variable V14230 in wave 20 of the PSID): “Now thinking about your
job(s) over the past year, was there more work available on your job [or “any of your jobs” if more
than one] so that you could have worked more if you wanted to?”, and answered no to the question
“Could you have worked less if you had wanted to?” This question was asked of those who answered
yes to the previous question, and was coded as variable V14232 in wave 20 of the PSID. It was also
asked of those who answered no, and was coded as v14235 in that same wave. Unfortunately, the
latter variable does not appear to be available for years prior to 1979. Also, as a referee pointed
out, these answers are in principle consistent with the respondent’s being happy with the hours
worked rather than being overemployed.
Eit = 0 : voluntary employment. (62%)
This is the case if, in year t ¡ 1, person i was an employed member of the labor force who was
classiﬁed as neither overemployed, according to the above deﬁnition, nor underemployed, as deﬁned
below.
Eit = 1 : underemployment/unemployment. (22%)
This is the case if in year t ¡ 1 person i was either underemployed or unemployed. A person is
underemployed if he/she is an employed member of the labor force who answered no to the question
whether more work was available, and answers yes to the question “Would you have liked to work
22Because of the obvious diﬃculties in adopting this procedure for any asset income other than interest and
dividends, observations with substantial “other asset income” were excluded.
44more if you could have found more work?” This is variable V14234 in wave 20 of the PSID. The
questions which lead to variables V14230, V14232, and V14234 became more precise over the years
but retained their basic meaning. Our deﬁnition is consistent with previous work [Ham (1982;
1986); Kahn and Lang (1992)]. As previous authors recognized, there is some ambiguity in how
individuals may respond to these questions; e.g., there is no indication in the data as to whether or
not a worker would require a premium to work overtime. Nevertheless, we think the phenomenon
of involuntary overemployment is real enough and makes suﬃciently good sense as an element of
labor contracts to warrant attention within our framework. A person was unemployed if he/she was
temporarily laid oﬀ, on a maternity or sick leave, or unemployed and looking for work. The latter
possibilities were ascertained on the basis of the question “Are you working now, looking for work,
retired, keeping house, a student or what?” For years 1975 and earlier, the coding of the variable
used to determine employment status, that is whether a person is employed, unemployed or out of
the labor force for a variety of reasons is coarser unfortunately, so that it includes temporarily laid
oﬀ workers among the employed. An important attribute of this variable is that it pertains to the
employment status of the respondent as of the actual time of the interview.
Whenever inconsistent answers to the above questions are reported, we proceed in the following
way (rather than delete them as others do). If an individual reports that he/she is neither voluntar-
ily employed, nor underemployed nor unemployed, then we classify the respondent as involuntarily
unemployed if the person was out of the labor force last year, and as voluntarily employed, if the
respondent was a member of the labor force. If, on the other hand, a person reports belonging to
more than one of the above categories, and was out of the labor force in that same year, then such
a person is recoded as involuntarily unemployed. Alternatively, if he/she was in the labor force and
classiﬁed as involuntarily unemployed, then he/she was recoded as not voluntarily employed and
not involuntarily overemployed; ﬁnally, if he/she was classiﬁed as involuntarily overemployed, then
he/she was recoded as not voluntarily employed and not involuntarily unemployed. Such a set of
variables have never before been used in their full generality to analyze employment status and, in
particular, the possibly involuntary nature of reported unemployment or underemployment.
45Construction of Labour Constraint Indicator, 1967-1975
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Q1. What is your current employment status? (V3967 in 1975)
1. Working now or temporarily laid oﬀ 2. Looking for work, unemployed
3. Retired, permanently disabled 4. Housewife
5. Student 6. Other
Q2. Could you have worked more hours at (any of) your job(s) this past year? (V4011 in 1975)
Q3. Would you have liked to work more if you could have found more work? (V4012 in 1975)
Q4. Could you have worked less if you had wanted to? (V4013 in 1975)
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Q1. What is your current employment status? (V14146 in 1987)
1. Working now 2. Temporarily laid oﬀ, on sick or maternity leave 3. Looking for work, unemployed
4. Retired 5. Temporarily or permanently disabled 6. Keeping house
7. Student 8. Other
Q2. Are you doing any work for money now at all? (V14148 in 1987)
Q3. Could you have worked more hours at (any of) your job(s) this past year? (V14230 in 1987)
Q4. Have you done anything in the last four weeks to ﬁnd a job? (V14237 in 1987)
Q5. How much would you have earned per hour? (V14231 in 1987)
Q6. Would you have liked to work more if you could have found more work? (V14234 in 1987)
Q7. Could you have worked less if you had wanted to? (V14232/V14235 in 1987)
Q8. Would you have preferred to work less even if you earned less money? (V14233/V14236 in 1987)
Q9. How many hours of work (if any) did you miss because you were unemployed and looking for work or temporarily
laid oﬀ? (V13752 in 1987)
Note: Q2 was not included in the 1976 PSID questionnaire. Q4 was included in the 1976 questionnaire and was
asked of all individuals responding to Q1 with answers in categories 3-8.

























































bpAS1bar Version (A) predictions, evaluated at mean values of explanatory variables
bpCS1bar Version (C) predictions, evaluated at mean values of explanatory variables
bpCS1e0 Version (C) predictions, individuals assumed voluntarily employed
bpCS1e1 Version (C) predictions, individuals assumed involuntarily unemployed or underemployed
NB: Recall that Version (A) estimations ignore all spillover eﬀects between the Liquidity and
Employment Constraint sides, while version (C) estimations take full account of such spillovers.



























opAE0bar Version (A) E0 predictions, evaluated at mean values of explanatory variables
opCE0bar Version (C) E0 predictions, evaluated at mean values of explanatory variables
opCE0s0 Version (C) E0 predictions, individuals assumed liquidity unconstrained.
opCE0s1 Version (C) E0 predictions, individuals assumed liquidity constrained.
opAE1bar Version (A) E1 predictions, evaluated at mean values of explanatory variables
opCE1bar Version (C) E1 predictions, evaluated at mean values of explanatory variables
opCE1s0 Version (C) E1 predictions, individuals assumed liquidity unconstrained.
opCE1s1 Version (C) E1 predictions, individuals assumed liquidity constrained.
NB: Recall that Version (A) estimations ignore all spillover eﬀects between the Liquidity and
Employment Constraint sides, while version (C) estimations take full account of such spillovers.
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